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INTRODUCTION

George Romney, shortly after his landslide victory in the 1966
Michigan Gubernatorial election, found himself the frontrunner for the
1968 Republican Presidential Nomination.
mass media proclaimed him the favorite.

Throughout the nation, the
Many journalists went as far

as to call him the most generally accepted potential candidate of the
century.

Sundry opinion polls indicated that his popularity was even

greater than that of General Eisenhower prior to the 1952 election.
Romney, at that golden hour, had never lost an election.

His

victories in Michigan had become more pronounced each successive
election year.

He had been elected Governor three times:

in 1962

by 80,000 votes, in 1964 by 382,000 votes, and finally, in 1966 by
a remarkable 527,000 vote margin.

With each victory, Romney's coat-

tails had appeared to grow longer until, in 1966, his personal
magnetism proved itself by sweeping virtually every
Michigan ballot into office.

Republican on the

All of this, as if to make itself more

noticed, had taken place in Michigan, a traditionally Democratic
state, a state usually controlled by Democratic labor unions, a
state which, until Romney, had not had a Republican Governor for
fourteen years.
In short, George Romney in late 1966 was atop a stunningly
successful political career; he had a bright record as Governor, he
had made very few noticeable mistakes, he seemed to be the key to the
Republican hopes for the Presidency.

2
In March of 1968, this same George Romney stepped up to a
microphone in Washington D. C. and announced his withdrawal from the
Presidential race.

In his own words, he had "failed to gain the

support of the general body of the American people."

His popularity

had ridden a roller coaster from above sixty percent in early 1967
to as low as twenty-six percent
withdrawal.

a week before his announcement of

Romney was, at that point, in such a hopeless position

in the final stages of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary, that
many of his advisors along with a private opinion research firm
predicted that, had he remained in the race, he would have received
less than twelve percent of the New Hampshire vote.

Observers had

noted that Romney's usual driving, dynamic nature had turned, in his
campaign's final weeks, to an attitude of defensiveness and apology.
History may be searched in vain for a popularity decline so
steep and pronounced as that which George Romney experienced.

The

frontrunner of January, 1967 had become the dropout of March, 1968.
What had happened?
Romney's demise?

What factors or reasons had been responsible for
The purpose of this thesis and the goal of its

content is to answer these questions.
The popularity of George Romney and its rapid decline is
indeed a political phenomenon.
ical history.

It is virtually unparalleled in polit-

Because of its unique nature, it is a subject that merits

examination and appraisal.

To the author's knowledge, this appraisal

has not been made as of the present time either in the form of a book,
a thesis, or even a major article,,

The reason for this absence of

literary analysis may be due to a general lack of specific knowledge
and insight on the subject.

As is the case in most campaigns,

3
particularly national ones, the most significant factors and inputs
leading to Romney's decline were the "inside" factors; the occurrences
and attitudes of which only a small handful of Romney staff members
were aware.

Therefore, any analysis of his decline by one not aware

of these "inside" factors would, of necessity, be only a surface
analysis, only a superficial treatment of the phenomena,,
The author, as a member of Romney1s Presidential campaign
staff from the summer of 1967 until the campaign's culmination in
March of 1968, had a chance to observe first hand a great deal of the
drama as it unfolded.

Elements which transpired prior to his

involvement were consistently referred to and reiterated following
his inclusion on the staff.

In his subsequent capacities as National

Student Campaign Director, Advance Man, and New Hampshire Home
Headquarters Supervisor, the author was able to note the occurrences
of the campaign, and to gain access to the opinions and observations
of the eight or ten men who made most of the campaign's crucial
decisions and who possess the most "in-depth" knowledge as to the
factors involved in the campaign's failure.
With this background, the author undertakes the task of
writing an analysis of one of the most dramatic popularity declines
in pqlitical history*
It should be pointed out initially that the thesis of this
presentation is an appraisal of cause<,

It would be easy to merely

report the events of the campaign, to write an article on what
happened, where, and when0

Rather than concentrate on this type of a

historical, chronological report, this thesis will seek to uncover
and explore the reasons, both circumstantial and personal, for the

4
failure of Romney1s candidacy,

It is true that events and occurrences

will have to be discussed in order to build a framework for analysis,
but the reporting of these items is not to be the purpose nor the
thesis of this presentation,,

Background material, both on the man

and on his campaign, will be used and presented in order to firmly
establish a basis for which to determine reasons and causes for
Romney's rapid decline.
In 1966, the United States stood at a crossroads*

Dissent over

the Vietnam war was coming into full bloom, riots in the cities had
been particularly bad that summer, fiscal problems abounded, and
President Lyndon Johnson was rapidly losing the last strands of the
overwhelming popular sentiment that had swept him to victory two years
earlier,,

The country was looking for a change*

President Johnson

had escalated the war he had promised to end, he had begun to meet
stiff resistance from congress in the domestic areas of his effort.
The American people seemed untrusting and unconvinced that they were
being told the truth about the war0

Too many times Mr„ Johnson had

spoken to them with tones of optimism only to turn around and commit
more troops and more money to a war that, to so many, seemed wasteful
and meaningless,,
As Lyndon Johnson developed this credibility gap, George Romney,
in Michigan, seemed more and more to possess the capacity to fill it,
Romney, to the press and to the American people, was a straight talker,
a driver, a ten-it-like-it-is pragmatisto

Romney was a Mormon, a

moralist, a family man, and a man whose honesty and credibility seemed
to radiate through any newspaper photograph, any press statement.
Romney, to many Republicans, was the antithesis of Johnson, the answer
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to America's cries for credibility, the bright hope for a Go(hP0
administration in 1968*
The first mention of George Romney as a possible Presidential
candidate came before he had even declared himself an official
candidate for the Michigan Governorship.

On December 16, 1961 he

commented that he was "considering becoming a candidate for
Governor."

Immediately, U. S. News and World Report referred to him

as "another Wendell Wilkie" and called him "a prime candidate for the
i

1964 Presidential banner."

From that time until Romney"s announce-

ment of Presidential candidacy on November 18, 1967, his political
stock had experienced a steady rise.
George Romney was born in the Mormon colonies in Mexico on
July 8, 1907, the fourth of seven children born to Gaskell and
2
Anna Amelia Pratt Romney.

Times were hard in Mexico, and before

young George had reached his sixth year, the revolution forced his
family to leave the country of his birth.

They migrated from El Paso,

Texas to Los Angeles and then to Rexburg, Idaho.

While in Rexburg,
3
George graduated from grammar school as valedictorian,,
One might
say that it was also in Rexburg that he experienced his first
Presidential aspirations.

According to a story retained in the

family, the thirteen year old George Romney once was told by his
younger brother that he could never be President of the United States.
"I am the only one in our family who can ever run for President,"
U. So News and World Report, December 18, 1961, p* 25.
2
Tom Mahoney, The Story of George Romney (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1960), p. 53.
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said George's brother, "because I am the only one that was born in the
United States."

"Not so," shot back George, "Since our parents were

citizens, we are all natural born citizens.

I can be President."

It is questionable if young George knew that his statement was to be
near prophetic.
When the Romney's moved from Idaho to Salt Lake City, George
attended Roosevelt Junior High School and then the Latter-day Saints
University High School.

In an attempt to uphold the tradition of a

family of athletes, he played on various baseball, football and
basketball teams during his high school years.

He came to be known
4
for his never-say-die spirit more than for his ability.
During his
Presidential campaign, Romney often quoted his high school football

coach who said "George Romney has tried to do more with less ability
5
than anyone I have ever known."
During his senior year at the high
school, George was studentbody president and, more importantly, met
Lenore Lafaunt who was to become his wife and eventually one of his
greatest political assets.
Following his high school graduation, George embarked on a two
year mission for his Church.

Between 1926 and 1928 he lived and

worked in London and Scotland, preaching the doctrines of Mormonism
to the British.

This experience was a powerful input into the

developing character of the young man.

While there he held numerous

4

Ibid., pp. 68-69.
5
George Romney, speaking in New Hampshire Presidential Primary
Campaign.
Marya Saunders and Bob Gaines, "The Missionary Side of
George Romney," Family Weekly (March 3, 1963), p0 5a
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leadership positions and perhaps began to feel his ability to motivate
and to lead.

The mission field was a place of uncompromising integrity,

of self-discipline, of goal setting and attaining.

George returned

home with broadened outlooks, with significant human relations
experience, and with solidified views of world affairs and politics.
This interest continued as he enrolled at George Washington
University in Washington D.C.

He took mostly night classes, and spent

his days in the office of U. S. Senator David I. Walsh where he became
a tariff specialist.

He did most of the Democratic Senator's research

during the debates on the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill and was responsible
for most of the speeches that Walsh delivered on the floor of the
Senate.
His tariff work brought Romney into contact with the Aluminum
Company of America.

At this point, his interests seemed to be split

between politics and business, and when the Aluminum Company offered
him a job as a lobbyist, he saw the opportunity to accomodate both
interests at the same time.
George's interest in Lenore Lafaunt had continued, and in 1930,
when he accepted the Aluminum job, he asked to be assigned to the
Alcoa office in Los Angeles where she was beginning her career as an
actress.

It wasn't long before he had persuaded her to give up her

acting ambitions in favor of him, and on July 2, 1931 they were married
o

in the Salt Lake Temple of the Mormon Church.
Having achieved his goal in Los Angeles, George requested that
Mahoney, 0£. cit., pp. 91-94.
8

Ibid., p. 98.
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he now be moved back to Washington, and to his capacity as lobbyist
He stayed with Alcoa in Washington until 1939.

His connections there

led him into the area of automobile manufacturing and the Automobile
Manufacturers Association.

The Association had an opening in Detroit

and offered Romney the position.

He accepted, and became the manager

of the Detroit office.
War intervened, and the AMA soon became almost completely
involved in the productive efforts needed to sustain the Allied powers.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Romney was named managing director of the
Automotive Council of War Production.

Almost simultaneously, in 1942,
Q

in March, he was made general manager of the AMA,
Following the War, Romney found himself holding a rather
prominent standing in the industrial world.

Several offers came his

way, the most significant two being from Nash Kelvinator and Packard.
The Packard offer was more lucrative, but Romney chose the Nash offer
because of the company's structure which appeared to hold more promise
of rapid advancement.

His appraisal proved to be correct, and he was

a vice-president by 1950, senior vice-president by 1952, and in 1953
when Nash-Kelvinator joined the Hudson Company, George Romney was
named president.

The name of the new company—American Motors/

During his rise in the business world, Romney managed to remain
active in governmental affairs.

During the war period, in addition to

managing the Automotive Council for War Production, he helped organize
the "Detroit Victory Council" to lend support to housing, transportation
9

Ibid., p. 115.

10

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 25,

9
and other war-created problemsc
Romney, soon after taking over American Motors, took an active
part in the formation of the "Detroit Citizens Advisory Committee on
School Needsc"

This group proposed one hundred and eighty-two

recommendations for school improvement, all of which were eventually
\lery

adopted,

possibly the success of this endeavor stimulated his

political ambition and gave him confidence in his political ability.
In addition to his work for school improvement, Romney, during
his pre-governorship days, provided leadership for:

The Detroit

Tomorrow Committee, The United Foundation, Detroit Children's Week,
Detroit Boys Committee, United Negro College Fund, Project HOPE, and
others.

The question of whether these activities led him into elective

politics, or whether he involved himself in these things because of
political ambitions is hard to answer.

Whatever the case, George

Romney was drawn almost inevitably toward public service.
At the same time, Romney was being recognized nationally through
his industrial and business accomplishments.
known as the "father of the compact car,"

He had become widely

He received one of industries

greatest honors be being awarded the "Industries' man of the Year"
award.

He received this award not once, but four years in a row

(1958-61).

These were only a part of the many honors that began to

let the public know who George Romney was and what he stood for0
Several traits made Romney appealing to those who read and
heard about him.
program.

For one thing, there was Romney's physical fitness

Romney feels that the "body is the temple of the spirit"

and that it is each man's responsibility to maintain that "temple"
in which his spirit dwells.

This trait can be traced directly to

10
Romney'sMromon backgrounde

His early morning "compact golf" games

(three balls for six holes, playing as though he were three players
going against each other) and his early morning runs through the snow
in the winter are almost a legend in the Detroit suburb of Bloomfield
Hills where he livedo
In addition to this, Romney is an active family man 0

He has

always been able to find time to devote to his wife Lenore and to
their four children.
Last, but certainly not least, George Romney, even then, had
the image of a deeply spiritual man 0

He did not work on Sunday, he

did not smoke or drink, he held a high ecclesiastical position in his
Church.
With these components forming his public image, is it any
wonder that people in Michigan began to talk about Romney running for
public office?
Whatever the reason, rather suddenly, late in 1961, people
began to mention Romney as a candidate for Governor,,

John Swanson,

the Democratic Governor at the time, had been in office for one half
of his first term, and seemed to be pulling the state deeper and
deeper into the fiscal quandary left by the prior seven-term Governor,
G. Mennen (Soapy) Williams.

Swanson was a young man (37) with a

distinguished war record, but many people felt that he could be
beaten in spite of the fact that Michigan had been governed by
Democrats for fourteen years.
Romney was looked to by many as an innovator, as the father of
the compact car, as a man of action who found solutions for problems
and rammed them into effect.

People encouraged him to throw his hat

11
into the political ring for the welfare of the state,
Back in 1961, Romney had been elected as a delegate from Oakland
county to the Michigan Constitutional Convention, which met in Lansing
from October 3, 1961 to May 11, 1962.

During this period, he had

served as vice-chairman of the Convention and commuted almost daily
from his home in the Detroit suburbs, a distance of eighty miles, and
had prorated his American Motors salary for the time off from work.
All in all George Romney had great influence and significance in the
calling and subsequent meeting of the convention,,

Michigan badly

needed a new constitution, and most of the statees citizens realized
it.
The new constitution, in its completed form, contained numerous
significant alterations for Michigan's government

The Governor's

term was lengthened; the former 120 State Boards and Commissions were
consolidated into twenty principal departments; single-member districts were exclusively provided for; senate terms were lengthened
from two to four years.

12

The constitution was submitted to the voters

in April and passed by a close majority.

13

Following the Constitutional Convention, Romney's public image,
already bright, took on a public service aspect which gave it
credibility and which gave emphasis to the "Romney for Governor"
cries that were being voiced throughout the state„
Romney's first public comment on his potential candidacy came
11
Michigan Challenge, June 1962, p, 5*
12

Ibid., June, 1962, pp. 8-11.

13
Deseret News, April 2, 1963, pc 1,
807,847 yes; and 796,223 no 0 )

(The final count was

12
on December 16, 1961, during the Convention,

He said, on that

occasion, that he was "considering becoming a candidate for the
Republican nomination for Governor."

14

After weighing the alternatives and prospects for two months,
Romney announced his candidacy on February 25, 1962.

His national

reputation was so strong by that time that his mere announcement of a
try at public life catapulted him into the national limelight.

Within

a week, both former President Eisenhower and former vice-president
Nixon commented on Romney as "A strong prospect for the "64
Presidential nomination,"

15

In looking back, it was truly phenomenal;

a man who had, only a year before, declared himself a Republican was
suddenly being talked about as a candidate for the Presidency.
Romney got his first taste of political opinion polls the week
after he announced his intentions.

A Michigan pollster published the

first results showing Romney with 41 percent of the vote, Swanson with
50 percent, and nine percent undecided.

Thus George Romney entered

politics as an underdog, a role that he was well accustomed to from
his experience of working himself up the business ladder0
In November, when the returns finally were in, Romney had won
by 80 thousand votes, garnering a little over 51 percent of the vote
cast.

His campaign had been of the personal, door-to-door variety and

Romney had learned that he communicated best to people in small groups
rather than in large gatherings.
George Romney 8 s great success during his first term as
14
15

LLSo News and World Report, December 18, 1961, pG 24,

Ibid 0 , p. 25.
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Governor was due largely to good fortune0

A national boom in auto

sales boosted tax revenue to an all time high.

The state, which was

85.6 million dollars in debt upon Romneyfls election, was very nearly
into the black by the end of his first two year term in office.

1 f\

Romney's political momentum continued to grow until, late in
1963, his elaborate fiscal reform proposal was defeated by the state
legislature.

Many of the press felt that this setback ended his hopes

of getting the '64 G,0,P. Presidential nod.

Romney responded by

saying, "I've got no political ambitions, but I am profoundly
concerned about the problems of Michigan6"
Behaving as though he meant this statement, Romney worked for
re-election while Goldwater's forces rallied the support that was to
overwhelm the '64 convention in San Francisco's Cow Pal ace.

Romney's

campaign for re-election in Michigan was extremely effective, and he
rolled to victory, gaining a whopping 56 percent of the vote and
winning his second term by 382,000 votes.

After this victory, the

Governor seemed more openly concerned with his national image,, Trips
to Europe and to Japan early in 1965 were only a couple of the things
that Romney did to bolster his image as a man of international
experience and knowledgeo

Many have since said that Romney's drive

for the '68 nomination really began just following the '64 convention*
As the "66 campaign approached, Congressman Melvin Laird, a
staunch Nixon man who thought that Romney's appeal was non-transferable,
stated that "If Romney can win Michigan by a good margin and pull
16

Business Week, Volume 92, p0 78.

17

Newsweek, October 28, 1963, p. 19.

14
1 O

Senator Griffin through too, the '68 nomination will be his 0 "

As

if accepting the challenge, Romney did just that, winning his third
term by 527,000 votes and helping to elect not only Senator Griffin
but also a host of other Michigan RepublicanSo
This, then, was the George Romney that emerged on the Presidential scene; a man who had never lost an election, a man who in every
way looked the part of political success.
The following analysis views Romney's failure to win the
nomination from three vantage points:

(1) The public vieWo

An

evaluation of the reason held by the American People for Romney's
failure,

(These "reasons held by the public" are derived from press

coverage which usually expresses the public view0
is termed "the 'outside' opinion 6 ")
members.

This public view

(2) The view of Romneys own staff

An analysis of the reasons which his own aides think were

responsible for his political demise.
are termed "the 'inside' opinion.")

(The views of his staff members
(3) The view of the author.

The

author evaluates the "inside" views and the "outside" views on the
basis of his own involvement in the campaign and on the basis of
personal correspondence with Governor Romney and staff members since
the campaign.

He then draws conclusions as to the actual "reasons."

(The author's view is called the "conclusion.")

Newsweek, November 21, 1966, p 0 35.

CHAPTER I

THE "OUTSIDE" OPINION OF ROMNEY'S DECLINE

The mass media records public feelings.
public feelings, and sometimes creates them.

It also influences
The media then, is a

good place to go to ascertain the most prominent publicly held
opinions about George Romney's presidential demise.

The New York

Times, between March of 1967 and February of 1968, carried hundreds
of articles dealing with, either wholly or in part, Romney's dropping
popularity and with various criticisms of some phases of his
i

candidacy.

A detailed perusal of this press coverage reveals

that there were eleven "reasons" or potential reasons for Romney's
drop that were mentioned more often than any others.

Different

writers emphasized different factors, but eleven possible causes for
o
Romney's political decline were mentioned more than any others.
They were:
1.

His "brainwashed" statement and other verbal blunders.

2.

The fact that he entered the race too soon; he announced his
candidacy earlier than he should have for best results.

3.

Campaign finance problems.

4.

His lack of knowledge of foreign affairs.

5.

Overall bad strategy in his entire campaigne
•''The New York Times Index, 1967 and 1968.
2
These 11, by actual count, were most prominent„
15
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6.

The conservative mood of the Republican Party (Romney was simply
too liberal to be accepted by most Republicans, especially party
leaders.)

7.

His r e l i g i o n

8.

His defensive attitude toward reporters; his lack of ability to
respond tersely to their questions.

9.

Lack of support from other Republican Governors.

10.

His refusal to "play politics."

11.

Nixon's underestimated strength.

(Nixon turning out to be

stronger than Romney and his advisors thought he would be; both
3
in the primaries and in the national opinion polls.)
The first of these oft-mentioned "reasons" is perhaps the most
worthy of extensive comment.

When Romney, on a late evening Detroit

radio broadcast, said that he felt the administration had "brainwashed"
him concerning what was really happening in Viet Nam, he touched off
a stream of criticism and downgrading toward himself that did not
ease up until his withdrawal from the race.

A great many political

observers called this single remark the turning point of his candidacy.
The general reaction of the press was that the last thing that the
country needed was a President who could be "brainwashed."

The term

itself was capable of arousing negative feeling due to its Korean
War connotations.
3
Obviously there is some interpretation involved in determining
what reporters are saying in their articles, but these eleven
factors were mentioned more often than any others. The twelfth most
mentioned "reason" was Romney's overloaded schedule as he tried
to govern Michigan and run for the presidency at the same time.
This "reason" was mentioned significantly less than the eleven
listed here, thereby justifying the discussion of only the first
eleven.
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Was this verbal blunder really the crucial factor in Romney's
popularity slip, or was the press "out to get him" so much by then,
that they would have found something to attack him on no matter what
he had said?

This is the kind of question that the subsequent analysis

of the campaign will answer.
Did Romney enter the race too soon?

He announced his candidacy

on November 18, 1967, about a year before the election, and was the
first major candidate to do so.

As the only major candidate officially

announced, Romney seemed to bear the brunt of press attacks, while
others, who in actuality were candidates, sat back and allowed the
nation and the press to continue to urge them to declare their
candidacy.

Perhaps if Romney had done likewise he would have avoided

the immense criticism from the press.

This too we will examine as we

look closely at the entire campaign.

It is well to note that history

would tend to negate this factor as a significant reason for Romney's
failure.

A study of the announcement dates of candidates in the last

eight presidential elections seems to indicate no trends as to the
most propitious time to announce candidacy (see Table 1 ) .
Romney's religion was mentioned extensively by the Times in
many different contexts, both positive and negative.
ship in the Mormon Church a factor in his failure?
recent

Was his memberHere again,

trends seem to indicate that Romney's religion was not a

significant factor in his decline.

Since World War II, the American

people have become progressively more liberal in their views concerning
a non-Protestant President

This more tolerant view is exemplified by

surveys measuring the countrys attitude toward potential Catholic
presidents.

Even before John Kennedy's victory in 1960, Americans,

18
TABLE 1
DATES OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY ANNOUNCEMENTS
Candidate

1936

Roosevelt
Landon
Borah

Jan. 20
Jan. 17
Feb. 5

Wilkie
Garnett
Dewey
Garner
Vandenberg
Dewey
Wilkie
Stassen
Dewey
Warren
Wallace
Taft
Stassen
MacArthur
Eisenhower
Harriman
Kefaufer
Stevenson
Nixon
Kennedy
Humphrey
Stevenson

1940

1944

1948

1952

1956

Apr. 10
Jan. 17
Dec. 3
Dec. 30
Jan. 3
Dec. 1
Dec. 4
Dec. 20
Jan.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Mar.

16
8
29
20
14
6
Mar, 1
June 10
Dec. 17
Nov. 16
Jan. 9
Jan. 3
Dec, 30
July

Rockefeller
Goldwater
Scranton
Source:

1960

Jan. 3
Jan. 4
June 7
The New York Times Index, 1935 through 1965,
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particularly well educated Americans, were generally able to accept
the idea of a Catholic president (see Table 2 ) . In the minds of
many political scientists, Kennedy's election permanently and unequivocally ended the Catholic debacle, and perhaps the entire
religion debacle in general.

Kennedy approached the issue head on,

asked the people to vote for the man and not for his religion, and
they did. 4
Of course, there is still some serious question as to whether
the American people would vote for a member of a cult or sect with
suspicious and threatening background,,

The point is however, that

Romney's religion, Mormonism, has become less and less suspicious in
most people's eyes.

Mormons had a very

high and disproportionate
5
share of high government offices already, and are thought of in most

areas of the country as highly principled and ethical people.
Indeed, at a time when the country seemed troubled about the
"credibility gap" and the "arm-twisting tactics" of its current
president, it would seem that a member of such a notibly scrupulous
religion would have, in his church membership, a rather formidable
advantage0

It is true that the policy of the Mormon Church toward

Negros plagued Romney in some instances during his effort, but this
would seem to be the only creditable aspect of the claim that
Romney's religion was an important factor in his popularity decline.
Governor Romney did indeed have campaign finance problems.
Though the press was often not well informed as to the specific nature
4
Theodore White, The Making of a President, 1960 (New York:
Doubleday), pc 83 0
5
Congressional Directory (Washington D„ C : Govermnent Printing
Office, 1968).
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TABLE 2
STATED REACTION TO A SUITABLE CATHOLIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE
Positive
1.940
1955
1966

Negative

62%
69%
73%

Undecided

31%
23%
22%

7%
8%
5%

31%
19%
17%

6%
4%
4%

14%
17%
31%

3%
7%
4%

15%
21%
35%
20%

4%
5%
6%
5%

Education (1956)
Grade School
High School
College

63%
77%
79%
Age (1956)

21-29
30-49

50+

83%
79%
62%
Region (1956)

East
Midwest
South
Far West

Source:

81%
74%
59%
75%

Public Opinion News Service, June 28, 19560

21
of these difficulties, it was accurate in its implications, as will
be developed in Chapter III.
The press was accurate in the other "reasons" that it mentioned
most.

Romney's lack of foreign affairs knowledge, his lack of an

overall campaign strategy, his defensive attitude toward reporters,
his refusal to "play politics," his lack of support from other
Republican Governors, and his underestimation of Nixon--all of these
were genuine factors in Romney's failure to gain the nomination.
As the following analysis of the campaign will show, the
press was, in some cases, remarkably accurate in its appraisals, and
in other cases, inaccurate if not naive.
Since the press generally mirrors the sentiment of the general
public, it is likely that these eleven reasons are the ones that are
most prominently held by the American people.

Comparisons can now

be made between these reasons and the reasons expressed by Romneys
staff as to his political demise.

CHAPTER II

THE "INSIDE OPINION"

Even to people who understand his deep religious convictions
and his iron-clad character, George Romney is a complex individual.
To people who do not understand these character inputs, he is literally
an anathema.

To this day, many of Romney l s closest aides fail to

understand some of his actions during the campaign.
Most of the members of his presidential campaign staff however,
particularly those from Michigan who have known him the longest and
best understand the inner man, agree that there were certain discernible
key factors that contributed most to his political demise,,

These

factors, derived from the author's personal association with these men,
can be put in the following list:
1.

Leonard Hall, the campaign manager.
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The Organizational problems, Romney's administration, or
lack of ito

3.

RomneyBs own personal commitment, the fact that he never
really made up his own mind^

4.

The "Teddy White Syndrome."

5,

Romney1s press relations, his attitude toward reporters«

6,

The Detroit riots and their effect on his "briefings" on
the important issues.

7o

Improper handling of the "brainwashed" statement after it
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had once occurred.
8,

Rivalries and lack of communication and coordination
between various elements of the campaign staff.

Leonard Hall
Even before his last election victory in Michigan, Romney
had been meeting with Leonard Hall, the grand old man of the G»0oPe
Hall had been national party chairman during the Eisenhower years,
but had been somewhat out of the power picture since that time,
Perhaps he saw, in Romney, a chance to get back into the mainstream of
power.

In any case, Hall dropped some impressive names, and Romney

hired him without any consultation with his long time Michigan aides.
This independent action by the Governor led to extensive in-fighting
within the campaign structure.

Mr. Hall, while possessing numerous

abilities and contacts, failed to grasp the tempo of the country.
Hall is a campaigner of the "old school,"

At 64, he seemed more suited

and adapted to and more familiar with the methods of the 408s and the
50's.

As John Byington,, long time Romney aide and campaign manager

of his last Gubernatorial effort, said, "When Romney hired Hall it
was on the same plane as if John F. Kennedy had hired James Farley to
2

run his 1960 campaign." '
Organizational problems
George Romney climbed to the top as an administrator, as a

Letters and tapes from campaign leaders to the author confirm
these to be the eight most prominently held "reasons" in the minds of
Romney's staff members as to why he failed to win the nomination.
Personal communication (letter) from John Byingtonc
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businessman, yet in his drive for the highest office in the land, he
exhibited an almost total lack of organizational ability.

No one in

the campaign really knew who to report to, and there was no real
communication in the organization, either vertically or horizontally.
This fact is forcibly illustrated by the fact that during the entire
campaign George Romney never once sat down with all of his key people,
collectively, to discuss strategy, finance, or any of the other
essential elements of the campaign.

This organizational problem

will be covered more thoroughly in the analysis of the campaign in
Chapter III.

Romney's personal commitment
Many people who were close to the Governor, including the author,
felt that the firmness of his resolve was a key factor in many things.
Several of his closest Michigan staff members have said, in essence,
"The run for the presidency needs, first of all, a candidate completely
committed to himself, with solid confidence that he should be
3
president."
As one staff member said specifically, "the moment must
come when the man stands alone, looks into a mirror, lays his ego on
4
the line, and tells himself that he is really going to go for it.
Romney, for some reason, it seems, never really made this strong,
personal, private commitment,
"Teddy White Syndrome"
Since historian Theodore White became famous for his "Making of
3
Personal observation and communication with other staff
members.
4
John Byington, 0£. cit.
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a President" books in 1960 and 1964, a condition had existed in Presidential politics that Romney did not recognize and did not cope
successfully with.

The phenomenon is, simply, that the press and the

sundry writers and reporters of the country, start watching candidates
earlier, and closer.

Some of the things that John Kennedy was able

to do in relative obscurity in 1960 were extremely visible to the
nation when Romney did them, even as early as 1966.

In December of

1966 for example, it was being reported, from the Republican Governors
Conference in Colorado Springs, that Romney was failing to get the
5
support of moderate Governors for his presidential bid,
This early
scrutiny by the press did not give Romney the time he so badly needed
to prepare himself to be a respectable candidate,

Romney's press relations
George Romney is not a man who can sit down with a reporter,
sip a cocktail, and be a buddy.

This factor hurt him greatly.

The

press, consistantly given the feeling that he was above them and that
they were his enemies, became exactly thatc

They began to pick at him

more and more, and the more they picked, the more antagonized he
became.

The more antagonized he became, the less he was able to be

confident in the presence of the press.

The Detroit riots
The riots during the summer of 1967 probably didn't hurt Romney
in the public eye as much as they hurt him by simply consuming so much
of his critical timec

The Governor had planned to use his summer to

5
The New York Times, December 24, 1966.
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be briefed on national issues, and the riots completely prevented this
by taking every

minute of Romney's spare time.

His plan was to meet

with experts from various fields on an island in Lake Michigan during
the summer, and thereby prepare himself to hit the campaign trail in
the fall. 6

Brainwashed statement
In an interview conducted on the Lou Gordon Show on radio in
Detroit on September 2, 1967, Romney made a statement that, because
of poor handling later on, became the symbol of his political demise.
Romney had good reason for saying that he was "brainwashed" on the
Viet Nam situation.

In fact, there is some evidence that he simply

lifted the term from an editorial that had appeared in the Detroit
Free Press only a few days earlier,,

Romney later said that he had

used the word on purpose in order to hit the American people with some
impacto

He had said basically the same thing several other times,

only with the use of a milder word, such as "snowed/1

The less

exciting words had not given him the impact that he wanted, however,
so, on the Lou Gordon show, he said "brainwashed*"

After the word

became an issue, most of Romney's Michigan people wanted him to meet
it head on, saying that it was the American people who had been brainwashed, and that it was precisely the proper word to use since they
were not being told the truth about the depth of our involvement in
Viet Nam.

Leonard Hall, however, prevailed upon the Governor to

Later analysis in Chapter III sheds further light on Romney's
intentions for these briefings*
The Detroit Free Press, August 18, 1967,,
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leave the hot issue alone, to let it go whatever way it would.

It

went the wrong way.
Internal strife
Disagreements with Hall became more and more frequent among the
Michigan staffers, and, as we shall see, contributed greatly to the
downfall of the campaign.

Two factions formed within the campaign;

one consisting of the Michigan staff and the other consisting of
Leonard Hall and the other people whom he brought into the organization.
Having looked briefly now at both the "inside" and "outside"
reasons for Romney's failure, the analysis can now move to a direct,
step by step evaluation of the campaign itself.

This type of

chronological study of the actual events of the campaign will provide
the data with which to evaluate both the public opinion and the staff
opinion.

On the basis of the actual facts of the campaign, final

conclusions will be drawn.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

In the summer of 1966, as it began to appear that Romney would
win his third Gubernatorial campaign by an overwhelming margin, he
gained progressively greater status in national opinion polls. His
Michigan campaign was in the capable hands of John Byington, and
Romney was able to turn a part of his attention to the presidential
decision which he had to make.
In August, he began taking occasional unannounced trips to
New York.

Generally there were pretenses of some sort for the trips,

but in actuality they consisted of meetings with Leonard Hall, long
time Republican leader and past G.O.P. National Chairman*

The only

people that accompanied Romney on these trips were Jack Mcintosh,
Walter DeFries, Dick Van Dusen and Max Fisher.
2
Mcintosh, a former U.S. Congressman, had been a Romney staff
member at various times during the Governor's administration while
maintaining his active law practice as w e l l .

U n t i l Leonard H a l l ' s

takeover, Mcintosh headed up the potential p r e s i d e n t i a l plans of the

Governor.
Van Dusen, a Detroit attorney, and DeFries, a Political
Mrs. Romney and Peg Little, the Governor's personal correspondence secretary, also often went along on these trips.
2
Mcintosh served in Congress from 1958 to 1960.
28
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Scientist with a Doctorate from Michigan State, were well established
Romney advisors.
Fisher, the millionaire head of a Detroit printing firm, had
been Romney 1 s chief fund raiser during the past two years.

He was

the head of the United Jewish Appeal on a national basis, and had
vast fund raising experience.
As the occasional meetings in New York became more frequent,
Mcintosh began working rather closely with Bill Siedman, a partner
in Diedman and Diedman, an international accounting firm.
was not without previous contact with Romney.
request, he had run for state Auditor General.

Siedman

In 1962, at Romney 8 s
At Mcintosh's

invitation, he began to handle the operations area of the formulating
plans.
The New York meetings with Hall came about as a result of two
primary factors:

First, Governor Romney, and to an even greater

degree Mrs. Romney, felt that is was important to be advised by someone
with long time national experience.

Mrs, Romney particularly seemed

to feel that a "big name" was important in any kind of a presidential
effort, even if the effort was, as the Governor put it, "only
exploratory at that time."

She did have a certain amount of

confidence in the long time Michigan staffers, but she seemed to
doubt their capacity to shoulder an effort as massive as a national
campaign.
Second, Leonard Hall had partially lost the power base within
the Republican Party that he had once enjoyed.

Nixon had more or

less ignored him in the 1960 campaign, even though Hall had been
national Chairman during the Eisenhower administration.

Since that
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time, Hall seemed to have aligned himself more with Governor Nelson
Rockefeller of New York than with any other leading Republican.
At the time he and Romney got together, however, Romney was the
undisputed front runner, and Hall, in Romney, probably saw the
opportunity he had been seeking to get back at the helm of the
Republican controls0

This is not to say that Hall was ideologically

opposed to Romney; it is likely, however, that he was more closely
aligned both in ideology and in character with Rockefeller„

Under

the circumstances however, he went after the Romney chairmanship with
vigor.
It is hard to know what the attitude of Mcintosh and the other
Michigan people was toward Hall at that point. Quite possibly there
was some resentment, but Leonard Hall is very impressive when talking
politics.

He can drop the right names at the right times, he can

talk of his personal relationships with past presidents, and his
listeners usually leave his presence with a feeling of disci pi eship
to the man, or at least with a feeling of confidence in his ability
to successfully manage a campaign.
It is important to note at this point that Romney was neither
committed nor decided as to his candidacy.

He constantly referred to

his meetings as part of an "exploratory effort" to help him to decide
what to do0

The pressures of the press, the polls, and his fellow

Republicans kept nudging him closer and closer to an active candidacy,
but he kept resisting and continued to state that he was "still
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exploring.
As Autumn approached, the Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign
continued to gain momentum,
began to get more conclusive0

Simultaneously, the meetings in New York

4

In October, Willard Marriott and Cliff

Foldger, both of Washington D C C. began to figure more prominently in
the effort.

Marriott, a Mormon like Romney, is the chairman of the

board of the nationwide Marriott Hot Shoppes, and a long time Romney
friend.

Foldger, a Washington investment banker is a close friend of

Marriotto

He too was well acquainted with the Governor

The two men

came in with great financial potential, expecting to raise and supply
the necessary funds in the event that Romney made the decision to
pick up the presidential candidacy banner.
As the November election drew nearer, and as his popularity
continued to rise, the press began to set its own goals for Romney.
"If he wins big in Michigan no one can stop him" was the general
attitude of the media0

Columnist Emmit Hughes of Newsweek magazine

stated, before the election that "if Romney can win in Michigan next
year by over 500,000 votes, no one will be able to stop him from
5
gaining the G.0»P, nomination,"
Romneyss "coattails" were also becoming an issue of great
discussion*

Could he pull other Republicans into office with him?

Could he get Senator Griffin, whom he had appointed to fill an
3
As is often the case, the people applying the greatest amount
of pressure to an announced candidacy by Romney were his close personal
aides.
4
Romney and his close aides met fairly often, though not regularly, with Hall, Marriott and Foldger in New York and Washington
during the last summer and fall.
5

Newsweek, November 29, 1965, p* 29.
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unfilled term, elected to the U C S 0 Senate?
questions appeared constantly in the media*

These and other similar
Romney and eyery

segment of

his life became more and more a part of the country's everyday newSo
The "Teddy White Syndrome" was coming into full and early effect„
As the 1966 election day drew nearer, Romney1s time was divided
between his Michigan campaign and his national "exploratory effort."
His allegiance, as well as his time seemed somewhat divided at this
point*

As Leonard Hall's plans moved forward in New York, the

Michigan personnel were less and less included in high level planning
and decisionSo

A battle between the "old" and the "young" seemed to

be developing; between the young men who had run Romney"s gubernatorial
campaigns, and who felt that Romney owed them a certain amount of
allegiance, and the old, symbolized by Hall, who felt that, by virtue
of their experience and seniority, they were qualified to call the
shots and to overlook the Michigan people who were pressing for
recognition.
Lines, then, were beginning to form.
Michigan people were lining up against Hallo

However, not all of the
People like Elly Peterson,

the Michigan G*0.P. chairman and Larry Lindimer, long time Republican
leader in the state, alligned themselves immediately with Hall,
partially because they recognized that power was concentrated there,
and partly because they were simply more in their own element with
Hallo

Mrs 0 Peterson, for example, is an old pro of the same variety

as Hallo

She had passed through the same stages, the same campaigns,

and the same philosophy-forming experiences that he had, and she agreed
See supra, p* 24,
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with him on almost every

point.

Mrs,, Peterson, at that point, was

particularly significant because of her rather great influence on
Mrs. Romney0

The two, in their dealings with each other, doubtlessly

bolstered their favorable feelings toward Hall and toward the
desirability of putting the campaign in the hands of the nationally
experienced "big names*1' A man Tike Leonard Hall, who had been
national chairman in 1952, before George Romney had even declared
himself a Republican, fit this mold to a teeo
When election day 1966 finally arrived, Romney came through
with flying colors*
of the vote cast,,

He won by 527,000 votes, a margin of 61 percent
Republican Senator Richard Griffin, an underdog

until the last minute, also won and his victory was attributed largely,
if not wholly, to Romney's coattailSo

The G,0oPo in Michigan gained

five state senate seats, eighteen state House seats, and five seats
in the U.S* House of Representatives„
went to Romney0

Most of the credit in all cases

Newsweek Magazine commented on the outcome and on

Romney1s performance in this manner:
Romney did all that had been expected of him in Michigan . . .
and more0 He swept to a lopsided triumph over the Democrats
in an overwhelmingly Democratic State. He cracked the labor
vote (50 percent), and the Negro vote (34 percent) for the
first time in Michigan Republican history, He carried protege
Robert Griffin to a handsome Senate victory over one-time
Governor Go Mennen (Soapy) Williams, and boosted five handcrafted, Romney-style GoOoPo Congressional candidates to upsets
over Democratic incumbantSo7
On the eve of the election, Romney appeared to be virtually
unbeatable,,

The Newswee^ article continued by saying:

Months ago, when it looked as if Romney(s appeal was nontransferable, Melvin Laird, a congressman and a staunch Nixon
Newsweek, November 21, 1966, pc 35.
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man, pointedly observed that if Romney could pull Griffin
through, the '68 nomination would be his„ Romney has passed
the teste 8
Following the election, in late November of 1966, John Byington,
the Michigan campaign manager, and Dick Headlee, long time Romney aide
and personal friend, found themselves in Florida for a week of rest
following the successful campaign.

The two had been co-chairmen

of

the inaugural and now were resting prior to their return and
suspected high-level involvement in the developing presidential
campaign of George Romney.

Byington, after a couple of days rest in

the sun, picked up a copy of a weekly news magazine and realized
9
suddenly that, in his own words, "all hell had broken loose,"
The
magazine had somehow gained access to some important information
leaks, and there, on the printed page, was the story of the battle
between the young and the old within Romney's organization.

Byington

and Headlee denied the report emphatically to the press, as did all
staff members, but in actuality, the article was stunningly accurate.
Excerpts from the issue included:
Already, his strategists are split over strategy. Former
G.O.Po national Chairman (and ex-Nixon man) Leonard Hall has
signed on with the Romney forces, but, according to knowing
Republicans, he is in a jurisdictional squabble with Romney
agent Jack Mclntosch, an ex-congressman who is closest to the
Governor Mclntosch wants, among other things, to organize a
nationwide chain of citizens' clubs for Romney; old pro Hall
considers citizens' groups more trouble than they are worth and
wants to concentrate on county chairmen and delegates, the men
with the power and the convention votes e 10

Ibid., p. 35o
Personal statement by Byington to the author.
Newsweek, December 5, 1966, p„ 31.
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The same article went on to indicate some of the views of high
level Republicans whose interest in Romney was becoming more intense.
Pennsylvania's retiring Governor William Scranton and some
other moderates think Romney should softpedal his piety and
concentrate on honing his positionSo Romney has, however,
according to one associate, "the deep feeling that he must
emerge as what he is: a spiritually oriented, decent businessman who has spent his life as a family and church force, " H
Byington, for obvious reasons, was disturbed by the article and
returned directly to Lansing to see the Governor.

He walked in on

Romney and told him frankly that he felt Hall's elevation and
acquisition of authority was a great and potentially costly mistake.
Governor Romney was visibly upset.

Apparently he had complaints

coming to him from all sides, and he chastised Byington and told him
that he was being poisioned by the rumors that were currently circulating among the Michigan staff.

Byington retorted that he had been

in Florida, hadn't seen anyone who could poison him, and had read it
all in Newsweek Magazine.
article.

George Romney had not yet seen the

12

From that time on, the schism was more defined.
between the "old" and the "young" was more visibleo
full-scale effort to bring the two factions together.

Antagonism

Romney made one
On December 6,

he allowed the official opening of his "Romney for President" headquarters in the Shoram Building in Washington D . C , and gave the goahead for a plan that put hall in as chairman and Mcintosh as ViceChairman.
Meanwhile, in Lansing, the Michigan people were going ahead
U

I b i d . , p. 32.

12

Personal recollection of John Byingtonn
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with an effort of their own.

Under the title, "Romney Associates"

they plunged into the two major areas of research and scheduling,,

The

research area was to deal with policy formulation and speech-writing.
The scheduling area handled the Governor's itinerary outside of
Michigan and weighed and selected from the speaking invitations that
flooded the office.
From December 6th, Leonard Hall was chairman and overseer of
all that transpired in Lansing as well as in Washington*

In theory,

the campaign at that point was divided by function, with Washington
handling publicity, convention delegate acquisition and general public
relations, and Lansing supplementing these plus doing the brunt of
the work in the important scheduling and research areas.
Even though, by this time, some of the Michigan people felt
disappointed in the amount of power vested in Hall, most realized
that what the campaign needed most at that point was simply to have
someone in charge.

Up until that time, there had seemed to be no

ultimate authority on anything.

Lines of responsibility had not been

drawn, no one knew to whom he was to report to or who he was to go to
in order to get the go-ahead on things that he wanted to do.
Perhaps if Leonard Hall had taken full control at this point,
when he really had the opportunity to do so, the ultimate result of
the campaign would have been different.

Hall, however, did not.

Apparently he was still facing some animosity, and feeling it in
return, in working with so many of the Michigan people.

His authority

to bring other people into the campaign was somewhat limited by their
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presence.

13

Hall also, at that time, wanted to move somewhat slower

than Romney and Rockefeller (who by then was actively pushing Romney)
wanted or would let him move.

Hall, from many indication, thought

it would be wise to run a slowed-down, moderated campaign at least
until Romney announced his official candidacy,

14

but pressures from

the public and from Romney's staff did not permit this.
Whatever the reasons for his reluctancy, Leonard Hall did not
grasp control when he had the chance.

Today, even among those who

resented Hall from the first, there is a feeling that "if anyone had
taken control in early 1967, including Hall, the campaign possibly
could have been saved,"
As it was, however, no one did take control, and the efforts
went forward in a divided and non-unified way that left everyone in
a perpetual state of confusion and frustration.
To firmly illustrate this fact, it can be pointed out that
ne\/er9

at any time during the entire campaign, was an overall staff

meeting held.

There was no instance when all of the responsible

parties sat down together in the same room to decide the structure,
the lines of authority, or the overall strategy for the campaign.
13
Mr. Hall, through his years and years of work within the
Republican Party, had built up his own set of allegiances and loyalties
to various people, and it was his natural tendency to want these
people in the most responsible slots within the campaign organization
rather than the Michigan people.
14
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that Hall
was completely correct in his feeling that the campaign should have
moved slower in itsinitial stages. He wanted to quietly begin to work
on the probable delegates to the Republican Convention, knowing that
they were the ones who had to be convinced before Romney could get the
nomination. Mass organization of the public, in Hall's mind, should
have waited until Romney was sufficiently prepared on the issues of
the day.
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Therefore, what was done was usually done on a piecemeal basis, and
always lacked coordination and harmony with other things being done
simultaneously.
This problem, it would seem, must

be blamed on either Leonard

Hall or on Romney himself, because they were the only two who had the
authority to call such a meeting.

Indeed, others proposed meetings

of this nature, in lengthy memos sent directly to the Governor.

No one

seems quite sure what happened to these memos, but they were newer
acted upon.

As the analysis of the campaign develops, numerous

efforts made by variouspeople to pull the campaign together, to give
it the congruency and the unity that it so badly needed, will be
evident.
While "Romney Associates" in Lansing and "Romney for President"
in Washington struggled along, other simi-independent efforts developed.
Under the direction of Dick Headlee, the volunteer and "grass-roots"
arm of the organization began to take shape.

Headlee, a past president

of the National Junior Chamber of Commerce, possessed vast organizing
experience and a wealth of friends and contacts across the entire
country from his J.C. experience.
to handle the volunteer area.

He was an impeccably qualified man

He broke the country down into the

western, central and eastern regions, and began Romney volunteer
clubs, college student Romney organizations, and community "Romney
for President" groups in each region.

Headlee filled in his

organization rapidly once he got started on it.

Manuals were

published for everything from local fund raising to the organization
and maintenance of small community "Romney for President" clubs.
At the same time that Headlee and others were developing the
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volunteer corps for the general public, another organizational arm
was forming a more specific purpose.

The "delegate acquisition"

facit of the campaign had begun to develop as a separate entity.

Its

purpose was simply to chose a qualified state chairman in each state
who would have the responsibility to personally contact and speak with
each potential delegate from his state to the upcoming National
Convention.

15

The goal, of course, was to commit as many delegates

as possible to Romney very early in the game.
At this point then, in the early part of 1967, the total
campaign structure looked rather formidable on paper (see Figure l ) .
In actuality, however, as we shall see, the internal problems of the
campaign structure were becoming greater rather than lessening.
One area of growing concern was finance.

As the following chart

indicates, finance was handled somewhat independently of the rest of
the campaign.

Max Fisher, head of the New Monarch Company, a giant

Michigan printing and industrial firm, was the finance chairman,
Fisher was widely known for his adroit fund-raising abilities,

i f\

and

had helped Romney significantly in his Gubernatorial fund-raising
efforts.

Fisher was one of the earliest and most influential

"prodders" trying to get the Governor actively into the presidential
race.

As Romney moved closer and closer to candidacy, and as his

At that time, of course, delegates to the National Convention
had not yet been selected. In most states, however, most if not all
of the delegates are pretty much pre-determined by their activity and
prominence in the party.
Primarily for religious causes, such as his chairmanship of
the United Jewish Appeal.

FINANCE

ROMNEY FOR PRESIDENT. Wash. D.C.
(Len Hall)

(Max Fisher)

-p=.

o
VOLUNTEER AND
GRASS ROOTS
(Headlee, etc.)
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ACQUISITION
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(Byington, Cross)
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WEST
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Student and Volunteer
Groups.
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Fig. 2.--Organization Chart
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popularity continued to increase,

Fisher became more and more

selfish about the responsibility of fund raising.

Fisher seemed almost

defensive at many times as he tried to shoulder the entire money
raising job himself.

Sometime before the end of 1966 he met with

Marriott and Foldger on his yacht off the Miami coast and discussed
finance with them.

His rather pointed opinion at that time was that

he could and would control the entire effort.

Unfortunately for the

campaign, Fisher, a Jew, was also the chief American fund-raiser for
the support of Israel in the Israeli War which began to brew at just
the time that the Romney funds were needed most.

As a result, Fisher

was consistantly urging frugality in campaign expenditures while he
spent his most dynamic efforts raising money to send to Israel.
Walt DeVries, about that time, described the situation in a
rather classic manner.

Speaking of Fisher, he said, "The son of a

. . . can raise six million dollars for war, but he can't put together
one half million for peace."
Romney's candidacy c "

("Peace," of course, referring to

18

Fisher, in essence, became so wrapped up with the Jewish
effort that finance follow-through became virtually non-existant.
According to the views of many staff members, well-healed individuals
were tapped for a thousand dollars for the Romney cause and fully
17

Romney, following his election victory in Michigan, held his
most commanding lead in the public opinion polls. At that time, he
led President Johnson by a comfortable 54 to 46 margin in Newsweek's
November 28 reprint of the latest Harris survey. Nixon, Percy,
Reagan and Rockefeller all trailed the President in the same poll.
Romney's popularity fluctuated in that same general area for the first
three months of 1967.
18
Statement made to the author and others in Lansing in August,
1967.
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expected to be asked for an additional ten thousand as the campaign
progressed.

These people in many cases were not even thanked properly,

let alone approached a second and potentially more lucerative time.
Many of the more involved campaign staffers sensed the magnitude
of the finance problem and made various corrective proposals.

An

example of these was an idea proposed by John Byington early in 1967.
Byington felt, first of all, that the fund-raising responsibilities
needed to be more spread out.

He therefore suggested that either

Milton Eisenhower or General Lucious Clay be publicly named the
National Finance Head for the Campaign,
job.

19

Both had offered to do the

Max Fisher would become the vice-chairman^

Under these two,

the country would be divided into five areas, each headed by a proven
fund raiser, from that area, who could make the contacts and the followthrough.

The western region, for example, would have been headed by

the Driggs brothers, owners of Western Savings and Loan Corporation
based in Phoenix,,

Byington called his plan "operation greenback,"

It was drawn up in the form of a lengthy memo, which, like so many of
the memos of the campaign, somehow disappeared without action or
deliberation,
Fisher, therefore, continued his individual struggle, and e\/ery
facet of the campaign struggled financially,,

It is quite possible

that, had more funds been readily available, many of the impending
problems could have been avoided0
19
General Lucious Clay, at the time, was the National head of
fund raising for the Republican Party and was working directly with
National Chairman Ray Bliss. He did, however, unknown to many, make
the offer to leave his national GcO.P* post in order to serve as chief
Romney fund raiser. Fisher, realizing that Clay would have to be
chairman, turned down the idea.
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Dick Headlee, in his volunteer area of the campaign even went
as far as to set up a separate fund raising element in the Western
United States.

He used the Driggs brothers (passed over by Fisher)

and began a separate account aimed at financing the Oregon Primary0
Headlee's effort was representative of the alienation felt toward
Fisher for his lack of efficiency in the all important fund raising
area.
By the spring of 1967, the still unannounced campaign and
candidacy of George Romney had serious internal problems,

Frustra-

tions were growing, and nothing was being done to mend them,,

Why

Romney himself never asserted his influence will be discussed in
depth in the last chapter of this thesis.

Whatever the reason, lack

of coordination at all levels of the campaign was becoming evident.
Efforts continued to be made to clear the air, to put the ship
back on coursen

Dick Headlee, in early summer of 1967, prepared a

complete organizational breakdown proposal which he felt would define
the lines of responsibility and eliminate the duplication and omission
that was occuring with such frequency.

Headlee, even though

very

close to the Governor personally, was unable to convince him of the
need for this clarification0

Mrs* Romney, interestingly, at this point,

could see Headlee's idea? and its feasibility, more radily than her
husband and expressed her agreement with the need to more clearly
define responsibility.
It is important to sense the large amount of import that Romney's
success or failure had in the minds of his staff members.

When a man

is standing in sight of the presidency, as Romney was, his every

action

greatly influences not only himself and his own image, but also the
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future and the lives of all those involved in his campaign with him.
Men leave their jobs, their occupational security, and hitch their
wagons to the rather speculative star of a chance for involvement with
the presidency of the United States.
With this in mind, it is not difficult to imagine the frustration
of the Romney staff members as they watched his presidential ship begin
to sink.

As they saw the signs of leakage, each tried, in his own

way, for himself as well as for Romney, to plug the leak,

Leonard

Hall, still reluctant at moving the campaign into full gear, balked
and stalled at almost every

suggestiono

Max Fisher, preoccupied with

the Israeli War, held the purse strings so tight that all actions were
somewhat confined, and Romney himself, still seemingly undecided about
his complete candidacy, pondered in relative seclusion and did nothing
about the mounting organizational problems„

In essence, everyone had

decided that Romney was a candidate but Romney himself,,

Pressures

from the bottom were either ignored or dismembered from the top, and
the campaign floundered,,

Romney staffers, who had given up much in

order to gamble on Romney running for and winning the presidency, went
forward full steam«

They had committed themselves.

Romney felt their

pressures and knew how much stock they were putting in him and in his
candidacy,

Romney, however, was still not committed to anything other

than an exploration of the possibility of becoming a candidate..

The

problems created by this discrepancy in commitment were massiveo
"Romney Associates," during the long spring of 1967, went
through innumerable changes and reorganizations.

Originally chaired

by Mcintosh at its inception in December of 1966, it had subsequently
been headed by Siedman, DeVries, Byington, and finally Travis Cross.
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Mr, Cross was a "big name,"

He had run a remarkably successful

Oregon Senatorial campaign for Mark Hatfield, and was widely recognized
for his public relations abilities.

Mrs. Romney, still obsessed with

the need for "big names" with "national reputations," had been pushing
for the addition of Cross to the staff, and finally Romney made him
an offer that he could not turn down.
and an option to quit at every

Cross was given $50,000 a year

three month interval,,

He was also

provided with a house on Michigan's Mackinah Island for his wife and
family.
The night that Travis arrived, the Lansing staff threw him a
party featuring a big banner that proclaimed the slogan:
Savior Travis."

"Welcome

No one was quite sure if the sign expressed a genuine

hope that Cross could revive the slipping campaign or if it was mere
sarcasm to another of the "big names" being brought in to transfuse
the effort.
Cross came in full of hopes and ideas, but soon was to realize
that things were too far afloat to be rapidly salvaged,,

Travis became

the Governor's press secretary as well as head of "Romney Associates."
He soon realized that the internal stresses of the organization were
too great.

At

first he looked for a way to get out., Unsuccessful,

he moved his efforts into the press area, and Byington took over the
helm of "Romney Associates" once again.
People like Cross, through no fault of thier own, served to
step up the already great internal frustrations of the campaign.
Experienced staff members like Dick Headlee were working for twelve
20

Personal recollection of the author,,
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to fourteen thousand dollars a year while Cross was making fifty
thousand.

In addition to the monetary inequities, Michigan people

found themselves working as errand boys for the new "big names."
John Byington, for example, remembers being "tracked down" by
Mrs. Romney's phone calls on several occasions.

Mrs. Romney wanted

to know why John hadn't located a cottage yet for Travis Cross's
family to live in.

21

At the same time that negotiations were going on with Travis
Cross, Romney was also trying to hire Clifton White, mastermind of
Barry Goldwaters pre-1964 delegate hunt.

Some glittering offers were

made to White but he declined them all.

Just the fact that the offers

were made had a similar effect on the Michigan staffers as did the
whole Travis Cross episode.
As spring progressed into summer, the national press was
becoming surprisingly aware of Romney's internal campaign problems.
The most precise press comment was the already mentioned one from
Newsweek that Byington and Headlee discovered while in Miami.

It

proved, however, to be only the start of increasing press criticism.
An in-depth perusal of national news weeklys shows that December of
1966, and that particular Newsweek issue, marked a real turning point
in the attitude of the media toward Romney.

Prior to that time, it

was difficult, if not impossible to find any negative comments toward
Romney in the press.

Just one issue before, in the same magazine,

on November 28 one could read:
Romney stands a better chance of winning the White House
than any other Republican since Ike. Among Republicans
21

John Byington, personal letter to the author.
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and Independents alike, George Romney is the clear favorite
for the G,0,P, nomination.22
Until December Romney was the golden boy of the upcoming
election.

With Romney"s vigor, his integrity, his orientation toward

church and family, it was next to blasphemy to discredit him in the
written or spoken wordo
The change, however, was abrupt,
issue (December 6, 1966), almost every

Following that particular
press article on Romney was

either partly or wholly negative or sarcastic*

From that point on,

though he made some temporary recoveries, Romney went steadily down in
the polls.

This decline can be graphically illustrated (Figure 2 ) .

The trend of press comments following December went from bad to
worse.

By March, people were reading things like:

A penchant for self embarrassment as well as failure to
deliver clear-cut foreign policy pronouncements have
convinced some observers that Romney is his own worst
enemy."
On the first of April, Leonard Hall opened a new "Romney for
President" headquarters in the Seagram Building in Washington„

The

press reaction was negative:
Romney's headquarters opening was an unimpressive affair.
There was no candidate, no band, no liquor, no girls, not
even Leonard Hall who was in Florida for a funeral,24
A week or so later, Romney gave his first major Viet Nam
25
The press,
again, was anything but impressed:

address.
22
23

Newsweek, November 28, 1966, p. 31.

Newsweek, March 6, 1967, p 0 34,

24
^Newsweek, April 3, 1967, p. 33 0
25

Newsweek magazine is used consistantly here to show the consistant trend of the coverage of a single magazine. Other prominent
news periodicals followed a similar trend.
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Romney finally delivered his long-awainted pronouncement
on Vietnam . . . He simply acknowledged what LoB„J<, had
said for years, that the conflict is complex, Romney has yet
to show a sure grasp of nationwide domestic problems and he
is an almost total stranger to the shadow world of foreign
affairs. A master of primer-book rhetoric, he has yet to
harness the kind of establishmentarianism ideologies and
skilled ghosts who gave such assurance to John Kennedy's and
Nelson Rockefellers speeches and position papers.26
In spite of the steadily declining attitude of the media toward
Romney, the campaign went into early summer with him still holding his
own in the polls and still looked upon as a strong and serious
candidate.

True, his speech was not always precise and elegant, but

America was looking for an honest, upright candidate, one who put
telling-it-like-it-is ahead of impressive verbage, one who's integrity
outbalanced his eloquence,

Romney still was, to a great many, just that

man.
The problem, however, was that Romney himself, at that point,
was still genuinely undecided as to whether or not he was a candidate.
With the background we have established so far, it becomes evident
that this fact was the root of most of, if not all of, the campaign's
problems,

Romney, a proven administrator, had failed to administer

the campaign at all.

While he continued to wrestle with his personal

decision as to whether or not he would run, his campaign, long
established in the minds of his subordinates, struggled along without real leadership or direction,,
It was during this long period of indecision that Romney
cultured his poor relationship

with the press.

Newsmen assigned to cover a presidential campaign are generally
26

Newsweek, April 17, 1967, p. 31.
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a crusty, tough and well informed breed.
one gets yery
mimic phrases.

No one fools them, and no

far with them by the use of worn out platitudes and
Most of the press, before Romney began traveling and

speaking extensively, genuinely liked the man0

They seemed to see in

Romney a sharp contrast to Lyndon Johnson and they realized that a
sharp contrast was what Americans wanted*
As Romney began to travel more and speak more often on national
issues, thirty or forty newsmen and members of the national press
consistantly tagged along.

It has become traditional for potential

presidential candidates to provide transportation, accomodations and
even food for the pressmen assigned to cover them,

Romney did this

and by summer he was constantly followed by a plane, a bus, or several
car loads of reporters and photographers from all of America's major
news services.
During the late spring and early summer, Romney, still undecided and unbriefed on national affairs, began to be pushed more
and more into national policy statements.

As this occurred, the

press was quick to note his lack of confidence, his non-precise
comments, and his usually exhibited lack of depth in commenting on
issues.

As the press began to attack him by the use of catchy

questions, Romney became naturally defensive toward them.
In an interview with Tom Foley

27

and Tony Ripley of the Los

Angeles Times and the New York Times respectively, the author was told
that, "In general, reporters have no particular dislike for Romney,11
"Actually," said Foley, "most of the press rather likes the man 0 "
27
Foley had covered Romney for two years by then„
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"They like Mrs. Romney too, and the way that they are always together.
Romney 1 s problem is simply his apprehension and literal fear of the
press.

This makes his communication with us somewhat strained and

usually rather poor.

Governor Romney simply hasn't learned to be

himself around the press."

"When he does," Foley went on, "he will

be much more liked by the press than his greatest opponent, Mr.
Nixon."
Ripley added, "If Romney can gain back the confidence and
self-assurance that I have seen in him at other times, and that he
had in Michigan, he will break this problem that he is having with
the press.
affairs too.

It may be true that he needs some work on his foreign
What he really needs though," conlcuded Ripley, "is

the calm, easy assurance that Rockefeller exhibits when he deals with
us."
What Foley and Ripley apparently didn't fully realize was that
George Romney's lack of assurance and confidence was steming primarily
from the fact that his own mind was still undecided as to whether he
was yet a candidate.

It was hard for a man as basically honest as

Romney to sound completely confident and committed on something that
he was not himself completely resigned to.
Tying in with Romney's lack of commitment was the decision he
was facing as to whether to resign the Michigan Governorship or not.
Romney ran the executive arm of Michigan much as he had run his business
operations,

Five executive assistants reported directly to him and he

parcelled out the various tasks and followed through on them directly.
By the summer of '67, Romney not only had these five people reporting
directly to him, but also Siedman, Mcintosh, Byington, Cross, and
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DeVries of MRomney Associates," not to mention Hall, Headlee and
others.

This intense activity simply did not leave him the time he

needed to make personal decisions.
The question was one of staying on as Governor and trying to
campaign for the presidency at the same time or resigning from the
Governorship, leaving Michigan in the capable hands of Lieutenant
Governor Mi liken, and making a total commitment to the presidential
drive0

Romney did not feel ready for the second alternative yet, and

was having trouble handling the first.

28

Seeing this, Walt DeVries

suggested a possible third alternative or compromise.

His proposal

was that Romney take a temporary leave of absence from the Governorship, refuse his salary during the time, and let Mi 1iken take over
Michigan for the campaign period.

Romney saw this memo, but, for an

unknown reason, put off taking any action on the matter.
Another example of the lack of overall strategy in the campaign
is the personal travel of Romney during the spring and summer0

There

was no provision made for outlining the areas of the country where
Romney needed to speak, the areas where his popularity needed
bolstering0

The task was simply never assigned.

As a result, when

the sundry calls came in, requesting Romney to appear, some were
randomly accepted, and some were randomly turned down.

It was sort

of a "first come first served" proposition without any regard at all
to the areas of the country that most needed the attention.
As the summer progressed, many campaign staffers recognized
the need to make some decisions relating to the rapidly approaching
28
Many Michigan citizens were becoming upset with Romney for
spending as much time out of the state as he was 0
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presidential primaries.

It was becoming apparent that Romney would

not announce his candidacy officially until November or December, and
there was a great deal that had to be done prior to that time in
states that were to have presidential primaries0
As with seemingly every

29

issue, there was significant dis-

agreement within the organization as to just what the strategy should
be for the primaries.

Most of the Michigan people felt that entering

the wrong primaries could be disasterous.

Romney's popularity was

largely based with independent and even dissenting Democratic voters.
In the Republican primaries, he would be forced to face Nixon on
Nixon's home battlefield:

the rank and file Republicans,

Nixon's

great strength was within the party, and to many, confronting him
with only Republican voters participating, was a risk too great to
take0
Late in the summer, Walt DeVries came up with another plan,
this one relating to participation in the primaries,

DeVries pre-

pared the plan in conjunction with Byington, Siedman, and other
Michigan people, and there was a rather general consensus behind it
among the "Romney Associates" group.
alternativeSo

The plan consisted of three

The first two were considered very strong, and the

third was included as a last resort.

The three alternatives of the

DeVries plan were basically as follows:
First, enter none of the primaries.

Instead, make a statement

indicating that the Romney campaign was to be a campaign to the
entire country, not just to the isolated seventeen states that had
29
The first presidential primaries are held in the early spring,
thus time was short and decisions were needed.
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presidential primaries.

Indicate that Romney's campaign was to be a

campaign to all the people; Republicans, Independents, and Democrats,
not only to the Republicans who would be voting in the G.O.P.
primarieso

Because of these reasons, state that Romney would enter

none of the primaries.

In states that require the names of all

potential candidates to appear on the ballot, simply do not campaign
at all, thus keeping the entire effort on a national level.

(This

plan was favored by DeVries and most of the others as it provided a
way to avoid dangerous confrontation with Nixon on Nixon's "home
ground."
Second, enter all of the primaries but campaign in none of
them,

This would essentially accomplish the same purpose as entering

none of them.

Simply allow Romney's name to appear on all of the

ballots but make a statement indicating that, since his campaign was
to all of America, he would campaign to all of America and let the
primaries fall as they would.

(This too was an accepted plan to

DeVries and the others because under it, they felt Romney could lose
a portion of the primaries and say, in effect, "So what, I never was
in those states, I was campaigning to the entire country.)
Both alternatives one and two, it was felt, would be successful.
Number three was least preferred.
Pick carefully the primaries that Romney enters and hit those
particular ones very

hard, making sure of victory in the ones entered.

(This alternative was considered the weakest because of the possible
losses that could result without excuse and also because the
opposition could say that Romney was afraid to enter the other
primaries.
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As it turned out, any of these alternatives would have been
superior to what finally happened.

Any decision would have been

superior to no decision, and no decision was made.
In the absence of a decision or guideline, staff members went
ahead on as many preliminaries as possible for the primaries.

In

Lansing, the preparation of a "book" for each primary state began.
These "books" included the election rules of the particular state, the
names of and essential information about the most influential people
of the state, population and ethnic charts and tables, and sundry
other information to facilitate a successful primary campaign if and
when the Governor decided to go into that particular state.
The most pointed example of the indecision existing on the
issue of which primaries to enter took place in connection with the
Nation's first presidential primary, that of New Hampshire.
William R, Johnson, of Hanover, New Hampshire and Dartmouth
College was widely recognized as the most adroit Republican politician
in the state.

He was known to favor Rockefeller for the presidency,

but with some urging, both from Romney1s camp and from Rockefeller,
he aligned himself closely with Romney as early as the beginning of
1967.

Johnson was and is a scholarly and thorough individual, and in

those early stages of Presidential speculation, he delved into some
extensive research relating to the question of whether Romney would
enter his state's primary.

Johnson administered questionnaires, he

analyzed the current feelings of the state on various issues, he
assessed the ethnic backgrounds of the sundry sections of the state.
He then put his results in the form of a 100 page memo which he
completed in February of 1967,

The simple conclusion drawn by the

56
memo:

Romney should stay out of New Hampshire*
No one seems to know what happened to this memo either.

No

one was aware of it until summer, and by then Romney had semi committed
himself to New Hampshire by allowing his staff to make some preparations there and by refusing to deny his candidacy.
In the case of the presidential primaries, there evolved
still another ideology conflict between Leonard Hall and the
Michigan staffers.

Hall's philosophy was that local people should

shoulder the responsibilities in the primaries.

If a campaign was

being waged in New Hampshire, according to Hall's inclination, New
Hampshire people should run it.

The Michigan people, on the other

hand, realized the need for local involvement, but felt that the
effort had to be run by knowledgable professionals with access to
modern and sophisticated techniques.
Before going further into the New Hampshire primary, it is
necessary to explore one other area:

that of Romney's lack of pre-

paration on the issues of the day*
Early in the speculation, plans were laid to use much of the
summer of 8 67 for foreign and national affairs briefings.

These

briefings were to take place on an island in Lake Michigan called
McKinah Island,,

Romney originally felt that if he were to spend two

or three days a week there, during the summer, with top experts in
various fields, he could come away well prepared to face the rigorous
schedule that he would have once he announced his candidacy.

Romney

had been an extremely successful pupil of briefings during his
Gubernatorial campaigns,,

Particularly in his first campaign, which

was his first try for any public office, people were amazed at his
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knowledge of Michigan and of the states' problems.

He handled the

press and fielded questions adroitly and with ease and accuracy,,
Romney, then, had always been one to "do his homework," to be
well prepared for whatever situation he might face, and with the McKinah
Island briefings, his presidential effort was to be no exception,,
These seminars were thoroughly planned and had taken considerable time to formulate.

Many of Romney's most valuable staff members

had put considerable time and effort
planning.

into their preparation and

Through a long chain of circumstances and procrastinations

however, they never materialized.
Early in the spring of '67, Byington, DeVries, and Johnathan
Moore

30

began to put together volumes developing each area of foreign

and domestic policy for use in the planned briefingSo

The briefings

were designed to include thirteen sessions of two or three days each,
with one to occur each week during the summer

Eight of these sessions

would deal with foreign affairs and five with domestic matters,

31

The

plan was that "Romney Associates" would prepare a volume for each
session and get it to Romney at least a week before he went to the
island for that particular sessione

The volume would include research

into the area of discussion for that week, clippings from books and
articles dealing with the subject, and other information in the general
30
Johnathan Moore is a Kennedy Institute member and a long time
student of and specialist in the Far East.
31

Actually, two of the eight "foreign sessions" were designed
to deal with the military; to discuss such matters as an antiballistic missle system* As such, they would have had domestic as
well as foreign remificationSo The plan, then, in detail called for
six foreign sessions, five domestic ones, and two that would involve
both areas.
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area.

Romney would go through the volume, giving himself at least a

conversant knowledge of the subject for that week, and then go to
McKinah for three days where he would discuss the topic with leaders
in the field, imported from universities and elsewhere.
Work went forward on these volumes; all thirteen were in various
stages of preparation by late spring, and contacts had been made with
many of the "experts" who were to come and brief Romney,

The

invitations were quite well received, and many top names in various
areas such as economist Walter Heller and foreign affairs expert
Henry Kissinger had committed themselves to be there at the appointed
times.
Romney, at this time, had offered little if any encouragement
to the preparation efforts, and most of the staff had begun to doubt
that the meetings would ever take place.
By spring the Lansing staff was holding staff meetings biweekly.

32

In one of these meetings, in May, Byington brought the

McKinah Island issue to a head by asking, "Do any of you really think
any of these briefings will materialize?"
"no."

The answer was generally

Byington's conclusion was, "This whole situation is ridiculous

because our time-consuming preparation is being utterly wasted."
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As the time for the first meeting drew near, Romney postponed
it.

Too many other issues were pressing, he said.

was also put off.

The second meeting

Then came the Detroit summer riots.

The riots were, politically, an interesting phenomenon,,
32
33

Meetings were sub-official, and poorly attended.
John Byington, personal letter, December, 1968,

Romney
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actually went up in the polls as a result of them, apparently as a
consequence of the American people's dissatisfaction with Johnson's
slowness in sending federal troops to Michigan's aid.

The riots did,

however, prevent Romney from ever attending a single one of the
planned briefings.
This is not to say that no use at all was made of the vast
amount of collected data.
it was of some aid to him.

Romney did pursue it, and quite possibly
The actual meetings, though, the well

planned briefings, the high level issue talks, neyer took place.
As the summer ended then, work was being done in all areas of
the campaign:

finance, delegate acquisition, volunteer mobilization,

scheduling, publicity, and research.

The kind of work that was taking

place however, was disconnected and therefore, in many cases, inefficient.
No cation had been taken on the proposals concerning the
upcoming primaries submitted by DeVries.

Romney did finally give

Hall a partial go-ahead for New Hampshire, however, and Bill Johnson,
in spite of his 100 page memo advising Romney to stay out of New
Hampshire, finally agreed to be campaign chairman for New Hampshire.
As the summer burned itself out, nothing of note seemed to be
happening in New Hampshire,

Byington, who by that time was primarily

concerned with public relations, wanted to go to the state and see
what was happening and, if nothing else, at least lay some groundwork
for effective publicity and public relations*

Hall acknowledged that

this was indeed Byington's field, but, said Hall, not in New Hampshire.
Hall re-emphasized his feeling that the "local people must handle it"
and turned down Byington's request to go.
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The date of voting in New Hampshire, the nation's first primary,
was the middle of March.

By early fall, most of the Michigan staffers,

failing to see anything happening there, began to be very

concerned.

Finally Dick Headlee elected to leave the helm of his volunteer
organizations and take a trip to the New England state,, Headlee did
this on his own volition, without assignment or acknowledgement from
Hall.

In Headlee's mind, it was time to take matters into hand,

regardless of organizational structure,

Headlee had already been

working rather independently in the finance area and on arrangements
for the Oregon primary.
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His semi-isolated efforts had been

effective and his volunteer programs seemed to be the most vital part
of the campaign at that point, so Hall made no move to stop him from
going to New Hampshire.

35

Headlee arrived on the scene in Concord, New Hampshire, where
Johnson had set up state headquarters, and found that, in essence,
nothing was going.

Johnson had a couple of young local New Hampshiri-

tes, who had no vision whatsoever of what needed to be done, running
the office while he himself was off in Hanover preparing information
for a computerized mail out that he hoped to send out before the voting.
Headlee was visibly upset; in his mind, it was organization and
grass roots support that was needed there, not a facade headquarters
and an overly sophisticated mailouto

Headlee had to get back to the

reigns of his nationwide volunteer movement, so he called in Robert
Norsworthy, a former Junior Chamber of Commerce cohort and confidant,

Supra, p0 43.
35
Headlee, from the start, appeared to have more capacity to
get along and see eye to eye with Hall.
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and put him to work organizing a system of "home headquarters,"
Norsworthy and others that Headlee sent in went about this task, and
by Christmas they had over a thousand of these "home headquarters"
set up0
Meanwhile, the same autumn, Romney himself was somewhat upset
about the slowness of the New Hampshire effort.

He counseled with

Rockefeller, who had faced the same primary before, and the New York
Governor suggested that he bring in "Campaign Consultants Incorporated,"
(CCI) to help outo

CCI had masterminded the brilliant "write-in"

victory of Henry Cabot Lodge in New Hampshire in the 1964 Presidential
primary.

They had a budding reputation for effectiveness, particularly

in New England.
Romney followed this suggestion and one of the three CCI
partners, John Deerdourf, moved residence to New Hampshire and began
to work directly with Johnson there,

Deerdourf and Johnson worked on

the research necessary for the campaign effort, and continued work on
Johnson's computerized mailout0

Norsworthy, Headlee and others

organized the grass roots, and, for a time, it looked as if things
were moving profitably in New Hampshire.
Meanwhile, in Lansing, Romney had at long last come to his
decision to officially enter the race.
directly ahead.

Once he had decided, he moved

On a rainy, windswept November 18, he stepped to the

same spot where he had entered politics five years before and announced
his candidacy for president of the United States,
These were homes throughout the state that would serve as
places of literature distribution, a place for Romney to meet small
groups, and a place to post "Home Headquarters, Romney for President"
signs.
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Immediately following his announcement, Romney had planned to
declare Hall the official chairman and Siedman and VanDusen the two
vice-chairmen.,

Siedman would take care of all operations, and VanDusen

would handle research and preparation.

This was to be a strong and

obvious effort by Romney to bring the two campaign factions together.
Under Siedman and VanDusen would have been eight lesser vice-chairmen,
each in charge of a specific area of the campaign, and possessing
complete authority to administer that area.
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The night before the announcement, however, Hall and Larry
Lindimer came in to talk with Romney, and before they left, they had
convinced him to leave Siedman and VanDusen and the other Michigan
people out of the top of the campaign picture.
If Romney had gone ahead with his planned reorganization, the
results may have been quite different.

The plan was one that would

have given each staffer a specific area of responsibility, and would
have given him complete authority to deal with that area in the way
that he saw fit.

This was precisely what the campaign needed.

For an unknown reason, Romney was persuaded by Hall and the
oo

new organizational structure never

surfaced.

At this point, the campaign was very much adrift but perhaps
37

The eight vice-chairmen under this plan were to be mostly
Michigan people, Byington, for example, was to be in complete charge
of Public Relations, Headlee would assume complete responsibility for
all volunteer activities, Johnathan "loore would handle international
policy formulationc
oo

It is true that this organizational structure was pretty
close to the way that people were already operating, but the point is
that, had Romney set this organization down as official, then, for the
first time, each person would have possessed specific authority for
a specific area,,
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the proposed revamping of the organization could have pulled it out
of its tailspin and put it back on its tracko

When the structural

change did not take place, it was like the driving of the last nail
into the coffin.
Back in New Hampshire, the Christmas holidays were passing.
Most of Headlee's people had gone home for a couple of weeks, and
things were at a standstill.

Early in January they were back, along

with Headlee himself but support seemed to be dwindling.

Nixon had

always been strong in New Hampshire, and when he was in the state people
flocked to hear him0
The second week in January, Headlee came back to Michigan with
a report of gloom.

"We are down to just the Mormons," he said, "and

in New Hampshire, there aren't very many of those,"
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Romney answered Headlee's plea himself, and for the remainder
of January and all of February, he and Mrs. Romney spent the majority
of their time in the state.
The "home headquarters" idea had been pioneered in Michigan,
in Romney1s last two Gubernatorial campaigns.

They had proved to be

immensely successful, and seemed to be a natural for New Hampshire
where most of the people are somewhat provincial, and would much
rather go next door to a neighbors home to hear a candidate speak than
to go to a meeting elsewhere for the same purpose.
sound, but it failed miserably,,

The theory seemed

While Romney trudged wearily from

house to home headquarters, talking to perhaps 20 people at a time,
Nixon was speaking once a week or so, to large audiences in public
39

Personal observance of the author.
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auditoriums*

It seemed that for a Gubernatorial campaign the close,

folksy, small group approach was fine, but for president the American
people want someone just a little above that, someone with an aura,
a mistique, not someone who will come into their living room and
grovel with them on their own level.

Nixon, in New Hampshire, had that

aura, that social distance; Romney did not*

As a result, Romney's

slide gained momentum/
By the first of February, in despiration, the Romney forces
had moved in mass to New Hampshire,

From the dual headquarters at the

Highway Hotel and the storefront in Concord, the state was divided
into eight areas or districts, each headed by a staff member.

When

Romney was scheduled for that area handled by a specific staffer,
that staffer would be in charge of the Governor while there0
Romney would come in on a bus with Travis Cross his press secretary,
followed by a full bus load of press members.

The staff member would

then lead him through his itinerary of meeting workers at plant gates,
speaking in home headquarters, and occasionally in larger gatherings,
and then send him off on his way to the next area and the next
engagement.
Governor and Mrs 0 Romney both seemed well accepted wherever
they went, and yet the Governor continued to fall further behind
Nixon in the opinion polls of the state,,
On March 11, an unexpected call came into the Concord headquarters from Romney himself.

It was, he said, to inform the staff

there that he was about to withdraw from the presidential race,

Two

hours later, in Washington's Hilton Hotel, Romney took the microphone
and did just that.

"I have failed to gain the general support of the
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American people that I had hoped to gain," he said.

Thus, in a bright,

almost relieved manner, he ended his presidential campaign.
Romney had gone to Washington two days earlier, presumably to
be on the television show "Meet the Press."

He had sent for Johnson,

deliberated with him and with Hall and had made his decision to withdraw.

He felt that a bad defeat in New Hampshire would not only knock

him out of the race, but would destroy what influence he had left with
reference to the party and to the formulation of the parties platform
at the convention.
When word of the withdrawal got to New Hampshire, there

was

only a couple of hours left before the time that Romney said he would
announce his pull-out publicly.

Headlee and Byington, true to their

character, immediately began a crash effort to get the Governor to
change his mind.

They and the other staffers in the office sent

telegrams to the Governor in Washington indicating that they thought
the polls were not accurate, and that there was still a chance for a
good showing in New Hampshire.
The staff members should have known Romney better.
man does decide to do something, he does it.

When the

George Romney had

decided to withdraw.
The foregoing chronological digest of campaign happenings has
steered itself relatively clear of analysis or value judgement.

In

the following chapter this history will be transformed and divided
into its component parts in relation to an analysis of the causes or
reasons for political decline that were involved.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Having completed a chronological overview of the campaign, it
is now possible to draw final conclusions regarding Romney's decline,
and back them up with established data0
The listing of the actual reasons for Romney's failure
corresponds in some instances to the generally held public opinions
regarding it.

It corresponds in many instances to the feelings of most

of the "insiders" of his campaign.

In sum, the real "reasons" for

Romney's failure to conduct a successful campaign, based on the
foregoing campaign history, along with a detailed analysis of each,
follows.
1.

The "Teddy White Syndrome" combined with,

2.

Romney's inability to decide unequivocally on his
candidacy, accompanied by his actions of allowing his
subordinates to move his "campaign" along without this
solid commitment to candidacy,

3.

which led to:

Strained and defensive relations with the press because of
Romney's lack of preparedness on foreign and domestic
issues; because of his failure to hold briefings and
learning sessions.

This led to:

4.

The media's attack on Romney's "Brainwashed" statement.

5*

Number two also led to the almost unbelievable fact that,
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at no time, was an overall strategy developed; nor were
the key people ever assembled to discuss strategy,
6.

Number two also led to the division and competition between
Leonard Hall and the "old guard" of the campaign, and the
young Michigan people, which, consequently caused:

7.

All of the middle management positions of the campaign
structure to be filled as the result of two factions working
against each other.

Thus, each time any position in the

campaign was filled, someone else in the campaign was
offended and alienated,
8.

Number six also led to the alienation and lack of effectiveness of Mcintosh, Siedman, and Marriott, and, to a lesser
extent, Headlee, Byington, Cross, DeVries, Van Dusen and
others.

9.

Number six was compounded by the fact that Romney never
really understood who his "friends" were, and was therefore swayed back and forth in his search for advice by
personally ambitious people not really interested in his
success or failure and also by people without any working
knowledge of politics,,

(i.d., Fisher and Marriott were

and are almost completely apolitical people.)
10.

Finance problems:

Max Fisher's failures and oversights

in this area, compounded by:
lL

Willard Marriot's heart attack which forced him to give
up the portion of the financial responsibility he was
carrying and the influence that he might have had on
Fisher in persuading him to handle the fund-raising
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area in a better and more effective way,
12.

Improper initial assessment of Romney's public image and
subsequent wrong decisions on how to present him to the
public during the campaign*

(Particularly at his

candidacy announcement and just following his "brainwashed" statement.)
13.

Romney8s lack of ability to create a working organization
and a functioning campaign framework and structure; his
inability to set up a working blueprint, both of people
and of strategies*

14.

The fact that, even after his announcement of candidacy,
Romney was never

totally committed to the effort and was,

therefore, unable to control:
15.

Rifts and differences among his staff concerning the
primaries, particularly the New Hampshire one.

16.

Romneyss mistake in even entering the New Hampshire
primary.

17o

Number fourteen also caused Romney to fail to ever really
delegate sufficient authority for anyone (except Hall)
to act independently and forceably,

18.

Number fourteen also led to the fact that Romney*s
decision-making priorities were out of whack; the
smallest and most insignificant decisions that should have
been left in the hands of lower members of the staff
often took hours, days, and even months of meetings,
memos and communications of the higher powers, often
including the Governor.

This kept everyone "mired in
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minutiae"

Sometimes these small decisions would be made

over and over again or would be revised and then revised
again, and then revised again.
On the other hand, some of the most significant decisions
over important matters were either never made, or were
made with no consultation even with the people directly
involved.

Some of these instances were so severe that

they left the staff "reeling in disbelief,"
190

Romney's lack of support from other Republican Governors,
brought on by his lack of ability to communicate with
them.

20.

NixonBs beautifully planned and executed campaign plus
the lack of ability of other segments within the Republican
party to either find or unite behind a single individual
who could give Nixon a real run for his money.

Many of these final "reasons" have been well verified already
in the previous chapter

On some, however, final, conclusive points

may still be pointedly elaborated and expanded,
1
The Teddy

White

Syndrome

which has already been explained,

was not a problem in and of itself as much as it was in connection with
Romney*s lack of recognition of it.

Had Romney realized how intense

and demanding his press coverage was to be, he would have realized
that he had only two possible courses of action:

(1) to decide on

his candidacy, at least within his own mind very early, and thereby
prepare himself for the early and demanding scrutinization of the
1

Su£ra_, pp0 24-25.
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press, or (2) to completely curtail all of the presidential activities
of himself and his staff until he had come to a decision to run, and
prepared himself fully,
Romney"s failure to anticipate the extensive early press
coverage (the Teddy White Syndrome) simply resulted in his failure
to take action to combat it. This oversight was perhaps the first
significant mistake he made,
Romney's inability

to decide

in his own mind concerning his

candidacy was complicated not only by the Teddy White Syndrome, but
also by the anxious nature of his staff members.

As already mentioned,

the men who were closest to Romney had their futures at stake just as
much as Romney himself did.
Romney himself did.

They wanted Romney's candidacy long before

Had Romney recognized this fully, he could have,

again, done one of two things:

(1) made it clear to his staff that

there could be no organization established until his own mind was
made up, and therefore asked them to wait, to refrain from any
efforts to promote his candidacy until he gave them the go-ahead, or
(2) decided, at least tentatively, to run and assigned specific jobs
to specific people.
As it actually went though, Romney tried to be too open about
everything,

He had not decided to run, and yet when a staff member

came to him with a campaign idea that sounded good, he said, in
essence, "Well, go ahead with it and we will see," Consequently,
because of his hesitancy to discourage his staff's efforts, he let
them go ahead on scattered, sundry programs, most of which were
neither completed nor fully approved, and certainly not coordinated
with each other.
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Perhaps Romney thought that these efforts by his staff would
help him decide, perhaps he thought that they would attract the press
in a positive way.

The result was quite the contrary.

What he ended up doing was to create a situation where he was
saying publically that he did not know if he would seek the
presidency while at the same time he was traveling in a huge
chartered aircraft with forty members of the national press, making
speeches and holding press conferences on national issues all over
the country.
In summing up, instead of either coming out and seeking the
nomination and taking the necessary steps to obtain it; or staying
home and running Michigan while possibly trying to privately prime
himself for a future campaign, Romney tried to do both.
The strained
by surprise.

press

relations

that Romney developed caught him

He had enjoyed a fairly stable relationship with the

Michigan press, and they had generally shown great respect for his
character as well as for his solid grasp of state problems and issues.
Romney had not gained these Michigan press relationships without
effort.

He had spent weeks being briefed on issues and discussing

various alternative solutions before each of his Gubernatorial
campaigns.
Although it sounds almost inconceivable, Romney completely
refused in the Presidential endeavor to take any significant time
for in-depth briefings or for discussions with people who could
present alternative solutions and answers to him.
This oversight inevitably led to his public inarticulateness
and his continual "reclarifications of previous clarifying statements."
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Romney began to show his lack of information at a particularly
inappropriate time.

He was the front-runner, and he was the best

target that the press had to shoot at. This is not to say that the
blame rests with the press, because the real blame can be put only
on Romney's lack of preparation.

The press, however, does have a

definite tendency to "get on the bandwagon" and once a few leading
commentators had criticized Romney, the whole press corps seemed
inclined to follow a very

similar pattern in their own coverage of

Romney.
Romney wasn't used to such "open confrontations" from the
press, and made the severe mistake of verbally "lashing back" at
them.

Verbal battles resulted, and Romney grew progressively more

defensive even to the well-meaning members of the press. It
wasn't long before "pinning Romney down" or "catching Romney" on a
point was the accepted norm among the reporters.
Some candidates somehow develop a realtionship with the press
whereby the reporters actually help them by asking questions in a way
that the candidate can make his best statements and exhibit his most
precise knowledge; with Romney, it was quite the opposite,
Romney, in an effort to be open and sincere, did too much of
his thinking out loud, where everybody could hear it and take potshots at his thoughts and proposals before they had been discussed
and refined in private.

These thoughts should have been carefully

combed over and polished before being exposed in public speech or
press conference.
Romneyrs "Brainwashed" statement3

made on Sptember 2, 1967, in

Detroit, was simply the focal point that much of the press had been
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waiting for, Already convinced of his lack of knowledge of issues,
they seized the opportunity to convince the nation of their views.
In the opinion of the author if Romney had not used the term "brainwashed," the press would soon have found another equally effective
focal point for their attack,,
No overall
that Romney never
session.

strategy

was ever discussed for the simple reason

called all of his factions together for a strategy

Instead, the Governor talked exclusively to one or two

people at a time and always told them not to say anything about the
conversation or meeting that they had just had. This left the staff
in a situation of little groups of people with little bits of
information, not knowing to whom they could speak concerning the
information they hado

This factor alone was responsible for a great

deal of the dividing of faction from faction and individual. The
failure of Romney1s campaign then, was not based on poor strategy, but
on an absolute lack of strategy,
Competition

between

Leonard

Hall

and the Michigan

rather inevitable under the circumstances.

people

was

Both wanted the Governor

to be more assertive and to make up his mind yet both wanted to be in
control.,

Hall felt that the Michigan people were too provincially

oriented, too used to dealing with things on a state level. The
Michigan people, on the other hand, thought Leonard Hall was too old,
was out of touch with reality and with the present, and was unskilled
in modern political techniques.
The rift between the "old" and the "young" has been adequately
discussed.

Byington, Siedman, Mcintosh, and many others were literally

perged from power by Hall.

Byington ended up handling part of
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scheduling*

Siedman ended up handling the comptroller duties, and

Mcintosh eventually was in charge only of congressional relationships.
Thus Romney1s effort to mix the new and the old people and their
philosophies worked about as well as mixing oil with water.
The only Michigan staffer who really survived the storm in
good shape was Richard Van Dusen.

2

He somehow managed to stay above

and aloof from the constant bickering between factions.

This, of

course, was partly because Van Dusen was merely an advisor--he still
had his law practice and was not basing his entire future on the
campaign as were so many others.
Romney found himself caught between being his old self and
trying to be someone who would fit Hall's model of the "sophisticated
national candidate."

Romney is very

poor at trying to be anything

other than what he is, but Hall had him convinced that he had to shed
some of his straight-forward directness and assume a more
sophisticated demeanor.

Sometimes Romney tried very

hard to do this,

other times he tried very hard to be his old straight-forward self0
The result was that he was never

quite either,

He was in a twilight

zone somewhere between the two and therefore pleased

no one instead

of everyone as he intended.
Middle

management

-positions

in the campaign were filled by the

contesting that went on between factions.

By the time Romney finally

did announce his candidacy, such divisions had grown to a point that
when someone was appointed to a position or responsibility (even
though that was what the campaign needed most of all) someone else,
2

Van Dusen is now Romney6s Undersecretary of HUDo
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from the other faction was offended.
Many Michigan

ness.

staffers

were alienated

by slowness and indecisive-

They, in most cases, stayed with the campaign, exhibiting a

front of supposed loyalty, and genuinely doing all they coulde

Under-

neath the facade, however, many of them felt as though they were
playing the martyr role, the role of the long time loyalist who is
pushed aside when the big reward is in sighto

This attitude, though

subconscious in most cases, had profound effects on their ability to
work cohesively for a single, undivided cause,
Romney really

never

knew who his

advice coming at him from every

friends

directi on.

were because he had

The task of discerning the

opportunists from those who were really loyal to him and to his
philosophies was an extremely difficult one^
Romney wanted to use others' advice to make his decision, but
he wanted to solicit that advice at his own pace, and assimilate it
at his own speed and make his final decision in a personal way. So
many "friends," well meaning and otherwise, thrust such a constant
stream of sundry suggestions at him that the task of discerning the
gold from the flax became next to impossible.,
Romney fs finance

problems

served as a general "slow down"

factor throughout the campaign„

During the entire fifteen month

period (December, 1966 through February, 1968) there was never a
national financial organization; there was never a system set down for
a solicitation of national funds„

Again, there was a complete lack of

a plan or strategy and Romney allowed himself to become the "captive"
of one man—Max Fisher—who "guaranteed" that he would raise
"sufficient" funds for the campaign.
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The vast financial support that Romney could have tapped in late
1966 and early 1967 (when he was the front runner and had a national
popularity of over 70 percent) was never solicitedo

People who weren't

approached at that early stage felt shut out and later were unresponsive to fund-raising as Romney's popularity dropped.
There was never
fall of 19670

an official budget for expenditures until the

People didn't know from month to month or even from one

day to the next just how much money would be available in a particular
area or for a particular project.
Siedman pushed Fisher fervently for a more responsible fiscal
policy and finally at least achieved a regular budget and an accounting
of area expenditures in late 1967„

Up until then, both fund raising

and expenditure regulation were conducted haphazardly,

"Then" was

too late0
Speaking in terms of specific amounts, the entire fifteen month
campaign was run on an expenditure of less than one and a half million
dollars.

3

The "announced candidacy" campaign (November to February)

had a total budget of less than $700,000.
sufficient amountso

These were grossly in-

Rockefeller, by comparison, spent more money in

his two month "crash campaign" (June to August) than Romney did in his
4
toatl fifteen months.
A presidential campaign 1s basically a matter of "selling" a
personality or an entity to the American people.

Any marketing

executive of any major corporation would instantly agree that one and
3

Richard Headlee, personal letter, January, 19690

The author, following Romney's withdrawal, went to work for
Nelson Rockefellers campaign and therefore is aware of his expenditures.
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a half million dollars is much too small of a budget to market a new
product to the United States.

Romney, as a man, a personality, or a

product, was not marketed successfully0
Willard

Marriott's

heart

attack

in early 1967 left him virtually

disabled for a time and sharply curtailed his fund raising efforts.
It is quite possible that, had he remained healthy, he could have
helped to "plug the gap" left financially by Fisher's inefficiency
and involvement with the Israeli war.
An improper

initial

assessment

of Romney Ts popular

image by Hall

and others resulted in some rather significant errors in planning.
Romney, in late '66 and early '67 was viewed by the masses
as exciting, as a vibrant personality who turned all he touched into
success.

The public saw him, in general, as a charger, as the man

who ran a mile every

morning, invented the compact car, fought the

"gas guzzling dinosaurs," slaughtered his political opponents in
elections and backed down at nothing„
Hall, in his strategy, failed to utilize this asset at all; in
fact, he completely ignored it.
The best example of this came with Romney's announcement of
candidacy.

Instead of staging an exciting announcement, with the

usual balloons, crowds and hoopla, Hall and others called for a
somber, rather austere luncheon,,

Romney announced his candidacy in

an almost apologetic tone, and the nation looked on rather blandly.
Romney's personality radiates when he is animated, excited, or
espousing a cause that is genuinely dear to hinio

Hall, instead of

using this enthusiasm, tried to suppress it and build Romney into a
man that he simply was note

Hall, in effect, tried to mold Romney to
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fit his kind of campaign, rather than molding his campaign to fit
Romney.
Another example, and perhaps the most significant, came with
the "brainwashed" statement,,

Hall and Fisher convinced Romney that

he had to play ostrich, put his head in the sand and wonder what all
the fuss was about; pretend that the statement had been a slip of the
tongue.

This type of behavior was simply foreign to Romney1s

character and personality.
He had meant what he had said, and many members of the staff
believed that the brainwash statement could have been turned to his
benefit immediately.

Romney, they felt, should have gone on

television and stated that he had used the term on purpose to
shock the American people into seeing that they had been brainwashed reguarding Viet Nam and what was going on there.

This appraoch

would have fit to a tee Romney's personality and his image as a
crusader for truth and credibility.
Romney '8•lack

of ability

surprised many people.

to create

a working

organization

This was the man who had risen to the top of

the business world by virtue of his organizational ability, who had
governed Michigan with organizational ability that was virtually
unparalleled*
People failed to realize one very

subtle complication:

all of

Romney's success as an organizer and leader had come in cases where a
structure, a framework, already existed*

Time after time, Romney

had proven his ability to step into a framework, assess its strengths
and weaknesses, and take precise and purposeful steps to make it
smoother and more effective.

For every

job he had owned in church,
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in business, in politics, he had a manual

he had a framework.

Never, in any previous case, however, had Romney proved himself in a
situation where he had to start from scratch, with no existing framework of any kind*
Romney is a creative person in the sense of implementing and
motivating much more than he is creative in the realms of framework
and organization*

If Romney had been given a manual, a blueprint,

for a successful campaign, no one could have impelmented it better;
but to create the manual, to develop the blueprint strategy was a
different thing, and was not in the sphere of superior Romney abilities.
Even after

his

announcements

his presidential drive.

Romney was not

totally

committed

to

As late as three days before he announced,

he was still saying, in private, to staff members, that he wasn't
completely sure just what he was going to announce.
The best evidence that he was not ever totally committed was
his decision to try to remain an active Governor of Michigan while
campaigning for the presidencyo

No man, regardless of the endowments

which his Creator gave him can possibly govern a state, manage a
presidential campaign, prepare himself intellectually for the
presidency, and campaign effectively for the presidency all at the
same time*
Perhaps Romney, being as religiously inclined as he is, felt
that his prayers were never truly answered.
to run, he never

Perhaps, in his decision

felt fully sanctioned by Higher Powers.

Whatever

the reason, Romney failed to exhibit the sense of total commitment
that had marked his life in all the other things he had ever done.
The rifts

and differences

among Romney staff

members^

concerning
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the

-primaries

contributed to his final withdrawal, but by the time the

primaries came, Romney was virtually "through" anyway.

The implementa-

tion of the "home headquarters" programs, and other programs that had
proved successful in Michigan failed miserably in the primaries.

Time

was not taken to assess the reasons for their success in Michigan in
order to determine their applicibility in other states and other
circumstances.
Romney rs mistake

in

entering

the New Hampshire

primary

culminating blow which felled his candidacy officially.

was the

In rejecting

the advice of William Johnson and others who warned him of Nixon's
strength there, Romney drove the final nails into his political coffin.
It is just possible that Romney could have salvaged his
candidacy if he had waited for the nation's second primary, that of
Wisconsin.

Since Wisconsin boarders on Michigan, Romney was better

known there than in New Hampshire, and probably was much better liked.
New Hampshire is a strange state in many ways.

The state has

long been the first to hold a presidential primary each election year,
and consequently presidential candidates on the streets are rather
common pi ace.

Many times, Romney found people in New Hampshire

unwilling to walk across the street to meet him—the people, realizing
the disproprotionate importance of their primary, want the candidates
to come to them.
New Hampshire is anything but representative of a typical
cross section of America.

There is very little industry, and, except

in two or three cities, the population is rural and provincial.
Romney initially thought this would work to his good as he exhibited
his folksy, door to door approach. As it turned out, however, it
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takes New Hampshire a long time to get used to someone.

Nixon had

campaigned there three times before and people knew and liked him.
In the slow-to-change New Hampshire minds, Romney could have never
overcome Nixon's popularity of sixteen years in three or four short
months,
Romneyrs failure

to designate sufficient

authority

was the root of sundry small as well as large problems.

to anyone

The old

problem of responsibility without authority came into play over and
over again„
Romney's decision making priorities3

as illustrated throughout

the previous chapter, caused undue concern over small matters and, more
importantly, caused the complete neglect of many larger, more weighty
matterso

When he should have been drawing up an overall primary

state strategy plan, for example, Romney was occupied with getting
Travis Cross a cottage on McKinah Island,
Romney fs lack of support from other Republican Governors was a

demoralizing factor throughout the course of the campaign.

Early in

the campaign, many people felt that the 26 Republican Governors were
the strongest single force within the party and that they, if they
could unite, would bring the nomination to one of their number. The
support that was continually being expected by the press, never came
from them for Romney«

The reasons are many, and some are on a rather

personal side.
One must first understand that George Romney had no "friends,"
or more accurately, no "buddies" among the other Republican Governors.
Romney, in the criteria of most, is simply not a "friendly fellow."
He is not the type of person that one would think to call to go on a

82
camping trip or a restful vacation.

He does not know how to "relax"

in the conventional sense of the term, he does not drink, he does not
make "small talk" very well.

All of these things, insignificant as

they may seem, and Indeed admirable as they may seem, served as
blockaids in the communications of Romney and his colleague governors.
Romney went to the governor's conferences to work, he did not
go to relax or to swap stories,

Therefore, while most if not all of

the governors respected and admired him, and his innate ability to be
both creative and productive in his role as governor, they never
thought of him as a "buddy,"
This fact was well known and privately discussed by staff
members who realized the implications it had with regard to deriving
public or private support from the governors.

Many ideas and plans

were put forward to counteract the situation, but implementation never
occurred,,
Consequently, the staff was not overly surprised when Romney's
active support among the governors narrowed down to Chaffee of Rhode
Island and Rockefeller of New York,

These two supported Romney not

out of personal friendship but out of a very

real belief that Romney

was the only so called "moderate" or "progressive" Republican who could
give Nixon a good race.
Nixon's

underestimated

strength

was a final factor.

Richard

Nixon, having learned and retained a stupendous amount of lessons from
his 1960 campaign, run a beautifully planned and executed campaign.
Most of the problems of Romney's campaign can find their exact
opposites in Nixon's efforto

His people had a goal, they had precise

plans to reach that goal, and they had black and white, precisely
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outlined organization and responsibility delegation system to
implement these plans,,
These last twenty reasons (italicized), overlapping and tying
in together as they did3 worked together to create Romney's downfall 0

POSTSCRIPT

How is it possible that a man who went over so well for so long
in Michigan, and who made so few mistakes there, could fail so
completely to sell himself to the American people?
To answer this one final question, we must realize that, even
within Michigan, Romney was never really "in" with the Republican
Party.

His election victories there came not from the Republicans,

but rather, in spite of the Republicans in Michigan*,

Romney aroused

the deep emotional goodness and feelings of the independents and of
many Democrats as well as Republicans,

These were the people who

elected him in Michigan—people who had seen him work in their state
for years, who had seen his honesty in business, his concern for their
state, who had learned to accept an occasional verbal blunder as one
small imperfection in an otherwise almost perfect individual.
The great question of Romney's presidential campaign is why
he forsook these people from whom he had derived his greatest and
most loyal support;•

It is true that Republicans nominate Republicans

and Democrats nominate Democrats and Independents nominate no one.
Still, Romney8s staff was aware, and so should have been Romney himself, that the Republican Party, still so conservative at the top,
would not accept Romney as its nominee unless he was forced literally
down their throats.

If Democrats and Independents had been used

more, if the backdoor had been used to "get to" the conservative
Republican bosses, perhaps things would have gone differently,
84
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The one other element, which, could it have been foreseen could
have changed things, was Lyndon Johnson's withdrawal from candidacy.
Had Romney been able to foresee this, he well might have remained in
the race, banking on the feeling that the G0O0P0 would have had to
nominate a man with broad voter appeal to beat the new Democratic nominee*

One of the reasons that Romney gave up as soon as he did was be-

cause he was convinced that Johnson would run again.

He knew that the

mood of the Republican Party was that "anyone can beat Johnson."

Most

of the party regulars, indebted to Nixon, had always wanted to nominate
him, and could have been deterred only if they really were convinced
that Nixon had no chance of winning.

With Johnson still apparently in

the race, and with his popularity slipping every
appear that almost anyone could beat himo

day, it did indeed

This being the case, Romney

concluded that the Republican regulars, not fearing defeat, would nominate the man to whom they owed so many political favors--Richard Nixon.
A casual reader of this thesis might set it down with the
feeling that the author is casting total blame on George Romney and
on his indecision0

Thus, in conclusion, it should be pointed out that

this is not the case*

All twenty innumerated reasons were involved,

and Romney can be directly blamed for only a few of themt

In

actuality the author deeply admires Romney and values his friendship
greatly0

In spite of this admiration however, and in spite of the

other factors involved, the balance of blame must be shouldered by
the candidate himself.

The personal reasons for Romney's indecision

and lack of decision may never be known more fully than they are
innumerated herein and Romney may sometime come to be known as the
man with the greatest chance who least wanted

the presidency.
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ABSTRACT
The meteoric political decline of George Romney is unparalleled
in political history and in the history of presidential campaigning.
In the space of one year, the man evolved from the overwhelming
presidential favorite of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents
alike to a presidential drop out, criticized severely and even
mocked by press and public alike,,
There are many opinions as to why this phenomenon occurred.
The press has opinions, the public has opinions, and the people
closest to George Romney have opinionSo
A step by step analysis of Romney's campaign casts light on
these opinions and completely discredits some while validating and
emphasizing others.
Romney's campaign had finance problems, it had personnel
problems, and, most of all, it had a candidate who never fully
committed himself to the campaign, who never truly and deeply wanted
the Presidency of the United States.
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